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Background: There is an emerging interest in the inadvertent harm caused to patients by the provision of
primary health-care services. To date (up to 2015), there has been limited research interest and few policy
directives focused on patient safety in primary care. In 2003, a major investment was made in the National
Reporting and Learning System to better understand patient safety incidents occurring in England and
Wales. This is now the largest repository of patient safety incidents in the world. Over 40,000 safety
incident reports have arisen from general practice. These have never been systematically analysed, and a
key challenge to exploiting these data has been the largely unstructured, free-text data.
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Aims: To characterise the nature and range of incidents reported from general practice in England and
Wales (2005–13) in order to identify the most frequent and most harmful patient safety incidents, and
relevant contributory issues, to inform recommendations for improving the safety of primary care provision
in key strategic areas.
Methods: We undertook a cross-sectional mixed-methods evaluation of general practice patient safety
incident reports. We developed our own classification (coding) system using an iterative approach to
describe the incident, contributory factors and incident outcomes. Exploratory data analysis methods with
subsequent thematic analysis was undertaken to identify the most harmful and most frequent incident
types, and the underlying contributory themes. The study team discussed quantitative and qualitative
analyses, and vignette examples, to propose recommendations for practice.
Main findings: We have identified considerable variation in reporting culture across England and Wales
between organisations. Two-thirds of all reports did not describe explicit reasons about why an incident
occurred. Diagnosis- and assessment-related incidents described the highest proportion of harm to
patients; over three-quarters of these reports (79%) described a harmful outcome, and half of the total
reports described serious harm or death (n = 366, 50%). Nine hundred and ninety-six reports described
serious harm or death of a patient. Four main contributory themes underpinned serious harm- and
death-related incidents: (1) communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients; (2) physician
decision-making; (3) unfamiliar symptom presentation and inadequate administration delaying cancer
diagnoses; and (4) delayed management or mismanagement following failures to recognise signs of clinical
(medical, surgical and mental health) deterioration.
Conclusions: Although there are recognised limitations of safety-reporting system data, this study has
generated hypotheses, through an inductive process, that now require development and testing through
future research and improvement efforts in clinical practice. Cross-cutting priority recommendations
include maximising opportunities to learn from patient safety incidents; building information technology
infrastructure to enable details of all health-care encounters to be recorded in one system; developing and
testing methods to identify and manage vulnerable patients at risk of deterioration, unscheduled hospital
admission or readmission following discharge from hospital; and identifying ways patients, parents and
carers can help prevent safety incidents. Further work must now involve a wider characterisation of reports
contributed by the rest of the primary care disciplines (pharmacy, midwifery, health visiting, nursing and
dentistry), include scoping reviews to identify interventions and improvement initiatives that address priority
recommendations, and continue to advance the methods used to generate learning from safety reports.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
ABSTRACT
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
viii
Contents
List of tables xi
List of figures xiii
List of boxes xv
List of abbreviations xvii
Plain English summary xix
Scientific summary xxi
Chapter 1 Background 1
Patient safety in primary care 1
Patient safety research in primary care 1
Patient safety incident reporting in England and Wales 2
Learning from patient safety incidents 2
The structure of this report 3
Chapter 2 Aims and objectives 5
Chapter 3 Overview of methods 7
Study method 7
Data source 7
Study design 7
Study setting 7
Sample selection 8
Classification system and reviewer training 8
Coding management system 9
Data analysis 9
Ethics considerations 11
Chapter 4 Overview of study findings 13
Overview 13
Severity of harm by incident category 14
Reporting locations 14
Reported age of patients 15
Reported contributory factors 15
Excluded reports 19
National Reporting and Learning System data limitations 19
Chapter 5 Serious harms and death in general practice 21
Overview 21
Priority contributory themes 21
Factors contributing to incidents describing serious harm and death 22
Examination of priority themes 23
Communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients 23
Physician decision-making 23
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
ix
Delays in cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom presentation and/or
inadequate administration 24
Failures to recognise signs of clinical deterioration 25
Chapter 6 Patient safety incidents in general practice 27
Communication with and about patients 27
Overview 27
Further examination of communication themes 27
Medication and vaccine provision 30
Overview 30
Further examination of medication and vaccine themes 32
Errors in investigative processes 35
Overview 35
Further examination of investigative process themes 37
Timely diagnosis and assessment 38
Overview 38
Further examination of diagnosis and assessment themes 38
Treatment and care equipment 41
Overview 41
Further examination of treatment and care equipment themes 42
Chapter 7 Discussion of findings and recommendations 45
Main findings 45
Quality of National Reporting and Learning System reports 45
Crosscutting issues for research and development 46
Implications for future practice and research 49
What can general practices do? 49
What can health-care organisations do? 50
What can national bodies interested in patient safety do? 50
Further research 52
Analysis of reports from all primary care disciplines 52
Scoping reviews to identify potential interventions 52
Broader characterisation of priority areas in general practice 52
Natural language processing 53
Develop and test empirically informed care models 53
Strengths and limitations 53
Role of professionals in reporting incidents 53
Nature of findings 54
Incident-reporting culture 54
Chapter 8 Conclusions 55
Acknowledgements 57
References 61
Appendix 1 Ethical review 71
Appendix 2 Rules of recursive model of incident analysis 73
Appendix 3 Primary care patient safety classification (PISA) system 75
CONTENTS
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
x
List of tables
TABLE 1 Study sample described by report period and level of harm 8
TABLE 2 Examples, description and number of reports by severity of harm 13
TABLE 3 Number and proportion of incidents in each category by the severity of harm 14
TABLE 4 Summary of patient- and staff-related contributory factors 18
TABLE 5 Summary of equipment- and service-related contributory factors 18
TABLE 6 Summary of excluded reports 19
TABLE 7 Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death 21
TABLE 8 Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death outcomes
by priority contributory theme 22
TABLE 9 Themes and subthemes of communication-related incidents 28
TABLE 10 Themes and subthemes of medication- and vaccine-related incidents 30
TABLE 11 Themes and subthemes of investigative process-related incidents 36
TABLE 12 Themes and subthemes of diagnosis- and assessment-related incidents 39
TABLE 13 Themes and subthemes of treatment- and care
equipment-related incidents 41
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xi

List of figures
FIGURE 1 Criteria for orientation to incident report content 9
FIGURE 2 Example of codes from the classification system using the recursive
model for incident analysis 10
FIGURE 3 Scattergraph of the percentage of harmful incidents by the frequency
of reports per location 15
FIGURE 4 Frequency of reports by age group 16
FIGURE 5 Frequency of level of harm by age group 17
FIGURE 6 Clustered bar chart of medication- and vaccine-related incidents by
level of harm 31
FIGURE 7 Clustered bar chart of drugs/drug groups by level of harm 33
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xiii

List of boxes
BOX 1 Examples of clinician decision-making errors about treatments 35
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xv

List of abbreviations
ABHB Aneurin Bevan University
Health Board
EDA exploratory data analysis
GP general practitioner
HCP health-care professional
INR international normalised ratio
IT information technology
NLP natural language processing
NRLS National Reporting and Learning
System
PAG Professional Advisory Group
PPI patient and public involvement
WHO World Health Organization
WHO ICPS World Health Organization’s
International Classification for
Patient Safety
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xvii

Plain English summary
Unsafe health care can result in harm to patients. Despite the fact that the majority of health-careinteractions occur in community settings, most research has been in hospital settings; therefore, very
little is known about patient safety in primary care. In 2003, a database called the National Reporting and
Learning System was established to generate learning from safety incidents and it now contains over
40,000 reports from general practice that have never been analysed.
We developed methods to identify the most frequent and most harmful patient safety incidents, from all
reports describing severe harm or death outcomes (n = 1199) and a random sample of 12,500 non-fatal
reports. Four doctors and one nurse read the free-text descriptions in each report and described the
incident type, potential contributory factors, level of harm severity and incident outcomes.
Communication-related errors were the most frequently reported safety incidents, and failures of diagnosis
and assessment contained the highest proportion of reported serious harms. We recommend four areas of
work to support safer health-care delivery for patients (1) supporting health-care professionals (HCPs) to
improve the content of future reports for local and national learning purposes; (2) developing information
technology systems to enable better communication between HCPs within and between care settings;
(3) supporting HCPs to explore ways of identifying vulnerable patients at risk of deterioration in the
community; and (4) realising how patients can work with HCPs to help prevent future safety incidents.
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Scientific summary
Introduction
Internationally, there is growing recognition that health-care provision can inadvertently result in harm to
patients. Policy directives have encouraged quality improvement programmes to reduce avoidable
morbidity and mortality, but these have predominantly focused on hospital settings. Despite the fact that
90% of health-care interactions with health-care professionals (HCPs) occur in primary care settings in
most developed nations, most patient safety research has been based in secondary care where it has been
shown possible to identify patterns in errors, determine those most frequently leading to major harm and
identify those most amenable to prevention. Formal experimental studies are now under way, investigating
approaches to reducing a number of such errors in hospital settings. Similar advances are now required in
primary care settings.
In 2003, a major investment was made in the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) to better
understand patient safety incidents occurring in England and Wales. This is now the largest repository of
patient safety incidents in the world. The NRLS contains over 40,000 reports submitted from general
practice over the past decade that have never been systematically analysed to generate learning for
primary care improvement. Analysis of safety incident reports is an underexploited area within primary care
patient safety research that could help establish the value of safety monitoring and emphasise the benefits
of an effective reporting system for those responsible for its delivery and governance.
Aims and objectives
The aim of this study was to characterise the nature and range of incidents reported from general practice
in England and Wales (2005–13) in order to identify the most frequent and most harmful patient safety
incidents, and relevant contributory issues, occurring within general practice. We then used these insights
to inform the development of recommendations for improving the safety of primary care provision in key
strategic areas.
Methods
We undertook a cross-sectional mixed-methods evaluation of general practice safety incidents in the
NRLS database.
Given the inductive and exploratory nature of this study, we analysed all patient safety incidents occurring
in general practice that resulted in severe harm or death (n = 1199) and a random sample of 12,500
non-fatal reports. A weighting was applied so as to preferentially select more recent reports and reports
describing more severe levels of harm outcomes.
Data coding involved five clinicians (four doctors and one nurse) independently reading the structured
(i.e. age, location, year) and unstructured (i.e. free-text) data in patient safety incident reports and applying
codes to describe the incident type, potential contributory factors, level of harm severity, and incident
outcomes. We empirically developed our own classification (coding) system, building on the World Health
Organization’s International Classification for Patient Safety.
Frequent generation of data summaries using exploratory data analysis methods with subsequent thematic
analysis was undertaken to interpret the most commonly occurring codes, such as those describing the
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incident, events leading up to it and reported contributory factors, within the contexts in which they were
described. The study team discussed quantitative and qualitative analyses and vignette examples to
propose recommendations for practice.
Main findings
Our statements are hypothesis generating and inductive in nature.
Observations on National Reporting and Learning System data and
their analysis
Development of a comprehensive classification system to characterise safety incident reports in general
practice has permitted the description of events leading up to patient safety incidents, their reported
contributory factors (human and system issues) and patient- and system-level outcomes. The four
independent classes used to describe the incident, its contributory factors, and type and level of harm
should provide sufficient minimal information for practising HCPs to structure their analysis and identify
learning for improvements in future practice from their own reports.
Two-thirds of incident reports did not explicitly describe reasons about why the incident occurred,
which significantly inhibits learning to improve future practice.
One in three reports (n = 4668, 34% of total reports) were excluded; this was most commonly because
reports contained insufficient detail (n = 810, 26%) or did not describe a patient safety incident (n = 784,
25%), or the incident was not relevant to health care (n = 762, 24%). This raises issues about the current
knowledge and understanding of the purpose of incident-reporting systems.
Safety issues within reports describing serious harm or death
Diagnosis and assessment-related incidents accounted for the highest proportion of harm to patients; over
three-quarters of reports (79%) described a harmful outcome, and half of all reports described serious
harm or death (n = 366, 50%).
In total, 996 reports described serious harm or death to patients. Four main contributory themes
underpinned serious harm- and death-related incidents: (1) communication errors in the referral and
discharge of patients; (2) physician decision-making hampered by failures of communication arising from
human and administrative and/or information technology (IT) interface failures; (3) delays in cancer
diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom presentation and/or inadequate administration; and
(4) delayed management or mismanagement following failures to recognise signs of clinical (medical,
surgical and mental health) deterioration.
Most frequently reported safety issues
Five incident-type categories account for the majority of safety incidents. These are, in descending order of
frequency: (1) communication with, and about, patients; (2) medication and vaccine provision; (3) errors in
investigative processes; (4) treatment and equipment provision; and (5) timely diagnosis and assessment.
Of incidents describing communication-related incidents (n = 2805, 21% of total reports), barriers
accessing clinical services (n = 636, 23%) and delays in referral (n = 669, 24%) were associated with the
most frequent and most harmful outcomes. Errors in information transfer between care providers (n = 756,
27%), accessibility to up-to-date patient records (n = 427, 15%) and miscommunication between patients
and professionals (n = 240, 9%) were described.
Medication- and vaccine-related incidents (n = 2484, 18.1% of total reports) were mostly underpinned by
the need for safer medication provision (n = 1429, 58% of medication and vaccine-related reports).
Immunisation-related errors described in children, the elderly and the immunocompromised were often
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caused by administration-related failures, such as inability to access records and inherent discrepancies
(n = 464, 19%). The need to mitigate avoidable adverse drug reactions (n = 130, 5%), to support clinician
decision-making about treatments (n = 121, 5%) and to provide more reliable therapeutic drug-level
monitoring processes (n = 120, 5%) was identified.
Investigative process-related incidents (n = 1339, 10% of total reports) were most frequently associated
with practical and administrative barriers to the collection and transfer of specimens (n = 866, 65%),
as well as administrative failures to receive and action results (n = 240, 18%).
Over one-fifth of treatment- and equipment-related incidents (n = 754, 6% of total reports) resulted in
serious harm to patients. The decisions about methods of administering treatment (n = 125, 17%)
and the functioning and availability of care equipment (n = 338, 45%) were described by HCP reporters
as preventable causes. Complications of treatment procedures were also described (n = 291, 39%).
Diagnosis- and assessment-related incidents (n = 728, 5% of total reports) were largely underpinned by
delayed triage and assessment of unwell patients (n = 242, 33%) or unsafe discharge assessment
processes (n = 141, 19%). A missed or delayed cancer diagnosis was described in 128 reports (18%).
The majority of these reports described human factor issues, particularly issues concerning knowledge and
skill competencies.
Recommendations and future research priorities
Based on our findings, we outline four areas of recommendation for research and development:
1. Maximise opportunities to learn from patient safety incidents via mandatory data capture and a
national, co-ordinated effort to support organisations to build the capacity and capability of their
workforce to understand the rationale for reporting and contribute report data for learning.
2. Build IT infrastructure to enable details of all health-care encounters to be recorded in one system,
aid communication between professionals and services and support safer administrative practices
(e.g. prescribing, referral, discharge communication).
3. Develop and test methods to identify, and manage, vulnerable patients at risk of deterioration,
unscheduled hospital admission or readmission following discharge from hospital.
4. Identify ways patients, parents and carers can help prevent safety incidents.
We propose three levels of recommendation to support the proposed advances needed: system level,
health-care organisation level and general practice level. We end by specifying specific next steps for research.
System-level recommendations
Supporting and encouraging primary care professionals to contribute to the NRLS is key to embedding a
reporting culture across primary care. Currently, there are numerous channels to report patient safety
incidents. These include the NRLS, the National Clinical Assessment Service, the General Medical Council
and locally at practice level through significant event analysis. The Care Quality Commission also conducts
routine inspections of general practices. These systems do not communicate with each other, resulting
in an incomplete national picture on patient safety in primary care. There is a need to create a single
mechanism of mandatory data capture.
Currently, in terms of mandatory data capture, the only incidents that must be reported are severe harms
or deaths, and those classed as never events. A list of never events has been developed for primary care
by de Wet et al. (de Wet C, O'Donnell C, Bowie P. Developing a preliminary 'never event' list for general
practice using consensus-building methods. Br J Gen Pract 2014;64:e159–67). Never events for primary
care should be considered seriously for further development and implementation.
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The future of the England and Wales NRLS must be secured in terms of providing a means for national
learning and the expertise and resources needed to undertake regular systematic inquiries into these data.
Large collections of incidents have a unique capacity for allowing the identification and understanding of
infrequently occurring patient safety risks that are unlikely to be characterised at a local level. A national,
co-ordinated initiative to support organisations to build the capacity and capability of their workforce to
report safety incidents in primary care is needed. In addition, timely feedback and generation of learning
reports that HCPs find useful and adopt into their own practice is essential.
Organisations must be supported to develop their incident-reporting culture in primary care and contribute
to a mandatory data capture system. This would require a combined enterprise between professionals with
clinical and governance expertise within the organisation to regularly review the output of analyses, to
corroborate with existing insights from research studies and improvement initiatives, and to develop
potential action-orientated solutions with strong face validity among their professionals. This co-ordinated
collaboration is particularly needed at a national level, where insights from care failures and safety
incidents can be more formally corroborated with research, and potential solutions developed for
application in practice.
There is a need for a system-wide IT infrastructure within the NHS capable of sharing data between
health- and social-care providers. In particular, efforts to link incident-reporting systems with electronic
medical records and other public- or social-care registries would enable identifying those at highest risk of
experiencing a patient safety incident.
Health-care organisations (including general practice level)
The incorrect use of the incident-reporting system resulted in a large proportion of reports being excluded
from this analysis, indicating that efforts to educate primary care HCPs and staff on the purpose and
functions of incident-reporting systems are needed. The assessment of contributory factors can provide
insights to inform the design of interventions to mitigate future safety incidents. Training for HCPs to
provide more comprehensive accounts of safety incidents could maximise potential to generate learning
from reports.
Ensuring the appropriate accessibility of clinical services must be a priority issue for all health-care
organisations, and general practices should determine whether or not their existing telephone and
call-handling processes meet the needs of their patient population. Practices should explore their current
processes for identifying, and managing, vulnerable patients at risk of deterioration, unplanned admission
to hospital or readmission following a recent discharge.
Encouraging patient and carer involvement, and creating a culture in which patients and carers feel
comfortable challenging HCPs, could prevent safety incidents. Furthermore, providing patients with greater
access to their medical records could reduce documentation discrepancies and appointment-related
incidents, as well as provide HCPs with a safety net. While waiting for diffusion of new technologies,
practices can, at the very least, appoint a patient representative to attend meetings to discuss process
changes that will affect how patients receive and interact with primary care services.
To shift perceptions of incident-reporting systems from being a ‘blaming system’ to a ‘learning system’,
organisations must consider how they can demonstrate that reports are being used to inform
improvement. To ensure that this is sustainable, high-quality incident reports need to be written by a
workforce capable of leading change in practice. HCPs need human factors training to identify the human
and systems issues underpinning safety incidents, and receive training on how to complete an incident
report, in order to assure the usefulness of incident reports to inform systems improvement.
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Further research
Further research must now include scoping reviews to identify interventions and improvement initiatives
that address the priority recommendations, and then determine their acceptability and feasibility with HCPs
in primary care with a view to evaluating their effectiveness when implemented.
Further analysis of general practice reports is also needed; a more in-depth review of all reports related to
those included in the frequent and most harmful incident types (e.g. diagnosis and assessment, vaccination
errors) as well as specific patient groups (e.g. vulnerable adults, unwell children) is required.
Further work is now needed to develop and test the content and delivery of training to strengthen the
ability of organisations to align their quality improvement agenda with learning generated by their
incident-reporting system, and prepare their HCPs to provide meaningful and informative incident reports.
Given that 13,699 reports have been manually coded by clinicians, this presents an opportunity to develop
algorithms and the technology capable of achieving natural language processing of patient safety
incident reports.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
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Chapter 1 Background
This chapter sets the scene for our research, giving key background information about characterisingpatient safety incident reports from general practice in the National Reporting and Learning System
(NRLS). It describes the emerging international interest towards patient safety in primary care, and the
opportunities and challenges for using the NRLS to inform patient safety efforts and, finally, outlines the
structure of our detailed report that follows.
Patient safety in primary care
Internationally, over the past two decades there has been growing realisation that health-care provision
can inadvertently result in harm to patients, known as ‘health care-related harm’. Around 1 in 10 hospital
inpatients experience a patient safety incident during their care.1 Unsafe care is thus responsible for a
substantial, potentially preventable, burden of disease.2,3 Over the past decade, most of the research on
patient safety has been based in secondary care, where it has been demonstrated that it is possible to
identify patterns in errors and determine those most frequently leading to major harm and isolate those
most amenable to prevention. Informed by these epidemiological studies,4 patient safety in secondary care
is now in an era of implementing interventions and monitoring their effectiveness in different settings.
There is now recognition that similar work is needed in primary care, and in February 2012, the World
Health Organization (WHO) convened its first Safer Primary Care Expert Group in Geneva, Switzerland,
to stimulate international action to support the delivery of safer primary care.4
Despite the fact that in most developed nations the majority of health-care interactions with health-care
professionals (HCPs) occur in primary care settings, little is known about the possible risks to patients and
their impact on patient health.3,5
Primary care poses unique challenges for the design of better-quality systems of care delivery.3,5,6
Given the different case-mix considerations and the approach to care provision between hospitals and
general practice, the ability to transfer lessons to primary care from efforts in hospital settings is limited.5
Challenges facing modern primary care could also inadvertently create greater risks of health care-related
harm; for example, patients are discharged from hospital earlier than before, and receive episodic and
decentralised care; clinicians prescribe and monitor high-risk drugs; consultations are time-pressured;
and continuity of care relies on co-ordination between many care providers and services.7
The Francis Report8 states that general practitioners (GPs) must play a greater role in quality monitoring,
and reaffirmed the responsibility of HCPs to report patient safety incidents and suboptimal care.
Demonstrating the benefits for learning from reported patient safety incidents is considered essential
to establishing a patient safety culture within health-care organisations.9
Patient safety research in primary care
The discipline of patient safety is predicated on the theory that harm is caused by a multifactorial chain of
events.10,11 The underlying assumption is that if systems (i.e. organisations and networks of organisations),
and working conditions within these, can be optimised, then patient safety incidents would be less likely
to occur. Determining the most frequent and most harmful safety incident types will support advances in
agenda-setting needed for patient safety in primary care. Established methods for examining health-care
safety, for example case note review, root cause analysis or incident reporting, provide different and
incomplete observations of those underlying problems.
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Our WHO-commissioned systematic review of the world literature (up until January 2015) determined that
patient safety incidents are a relatively frequent occurrence in primary care (around 2–3% of consultations),
although only around 4% of those result in severe harm.12 The review identified that few studies have
hypothesised or explored the relationship between cause (error) and effect (harm), and the underlying
system failures in primary care.7,13–18 Typically such insights about contributory factors can be found in
studies that have investigated root causes of patient safety incidents (i.e. root cause analyses) as well as
analysis of free-text descriptions of safety incidents in incident-reporting systems. No such studies have
occurred within general practice in the UK. Although around 6% of patient safety incidents are reported in
hospital settings,19 the figure is likely to be considerably lower in primary care, which contributes < 1% of
reports to the NRLS from England and Wales.20 Given the similarities of challenges faced by primary care
services in developed nations identified by an international Delphi consensus study, a detailed analysis of
(to our knowledge) the largest repository of general practice safety incidents could support action in priority
areas of patient safety in primary care.6
Patient safety incident reporting in England and Wales
Incident-reporting systems have previously been used to identify priority areas and generate recommendations
to improve care quality and safety at a local and national level.21–24 In 2003, a major investment was made in
the NRLS to better understand incidents occurring in England and Wales. Each hospital and health-care facility
has a reporting system that collects paper or electronically submitted incident forms. Since 2004, NHS
organisations in England and Wales have uploaded their incidents to the NRLS central database. Around
100,000 incidents a month are uploaded, making it the most comprehensive system in the world. The NRLS
has informed multiple learning outputs, including rapid response reports, patient safety alerts, and safer
practice notices.20 Despite these initiatives, incident-reporting systems have gained little respect from the
health information and research and clinical communities.23,25
The NRLS contains information about incidents with ‘free-text’ descriptions of the events, perceived
contributing factors and plans to minimise risk of reoccurrence. Over 40,000 reports from general practice
in England and Wales have been submitted to the NRLS in the past decade, and these have never
previously been systematically analysed. The under-representation of general practice within the NRLS
suggests that there has been a poor reporting culture among staff in England and Wales in the past
decade and is probably a reflection of the national emphasis placed on patient safety in hospital settings.26
Paradoxically, despite the large number of incident reports received by patient safety-reporting systems like
the NRLS, a mismatch exists between what actually occurs in clinical care and what HCPs report as a
patient safety incident.19 A characterisation of how HCPs in general practice interpret ‘patient safety
incident’ is needed if efforts can be undertaken to advance the agenda around what gets reported for
system learning.
Incident reports permit a retrospective window on the health-care system, providing an opportunity for
directing improvement initiatives by identifying weaknesses in the system that lead to errors and harms
experienced by patients.27 Large-scale incident analysis is an underexploited area within primary care
patient safety and should serve to demonstrate the value of safety monitoring, as well as emphasise the
benefits of an effective reporting system for HCPs, managers, leaders and patients.
Learning from patient safety incidents
Supporters of patient safety-reporting systems believe that they are not being used to their full potential to
benefit patients.28 Patient safety incidents can have a major impact on patients’ lives downstream, with
potential for litigation claims. Having a system in place to advance understanding through learning about
the magnitude and nature of preventable harm can offer insights into how best to protect patients,
clinicians and health-care organisations.
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Leading experts recognise that despite limitations of reporting systems (under-reporting, incomplete view
of incident and reporting biases), they provide multiple perspectives over time and form an integral part of
routine monitoring in clinical practice.29 The NRLS has provided insight into understanding underlying
system failures and has helped identify areas for intervention in secondary care, including: (1) prescribing
and monitoring lithium therapy;30 (2) reliable administration of insulin;31 (3) early detection of complications
in surgical care;32–34 and (4) essential care after an inpatient fall.35 Furthermore, clinical researchers have
explored descriptions of patient safety incidents in anaesthesia and identified system deficiencies relating
to practical procedures, communication of information to patients, verbal and written communication
practices, and continuity of care.36 Their analysis also led to the development of an anaesthesia-specific
incident report data collection form.37
There has been minimal development of methods for maximising the potential of learning from incident
reports. National systems rely on patient safety experts methodically trawling through patient safety
incidents by severity and frequency. For example, each incident reported as leading to death or severe
harm is reviewed individually by trained clinical staff at the NHS Commissioning Board (formerly the
National Patient Safety Agency) and a range of outputs are produced to provide solutions to patient safety
problems. These include one-page reports called rapid response reports, quarterly data summaries and
topic-specific information on issues such as preventing inpatient falls in hospitals. NRLS staff will frequently
consult subject matter experts from professional organisations, such as the Royal Colleges. NHS
organisations are also subject to deadlines by which they are expected to implement key findings from
such reports. These have offered important insights that have helped shape national policy – for example,
demonstrating the risks of bone cement implantation syndrome associated with use of cement in hip
fracture surgery, and the potential for information technology (IT)-based interventions to reduce many
cases of drug allergy-related morbidity.26,38
Although there is substantial evidence that the NRLS can identify priority issues for intervention, there is a
risk that the opportunity for learning is confined to England and Wales; a major limitation exists for
comparison between health-care systems, as there is no widely used standardised taxonomy for classifying
incidents in primary care settings.39–41 This means that studies currently define and measure incidents
differently, resulting in variations in the estimated proportions of incidents and harms.
The structure of this report
After this introduction, Chapter 2 gives the aims and objectives of our characterisation of patient
safety incident reports from general practice in England and Wales, followed by an overview of the
mixed-methods approach that was developed to achieve this (see Chapter 3). An overview of our findings
is included in Chapter 4, followed by a report of our analysis of all severe harms and deaths occurring
in general practice in Chapter 5, and a report of analyses for each major safety incident category in
Chapter 6. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the implications of this work in relation to existing literature within
the field and present the conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from this study. Relevant
supporting material is presented in the appendices.
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Chapter 2 Aims and objectives
We undertook a mixed-methods study to characterise the nature and range of incidents reported fromgeneral practice in England and Wales.
The objectives were to:
1. develop a classification using empirical evidence from reports
2. describe the frequency of different types of incidents
3. describe incident characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geography, time of day and level of
patient harm
4. determine which characteristics are associated with different levels of patient harm using exploratory
data analysis (EDA)
5. map relationships between themes (i.e. categories of incidents and potential contributory factors) and
elicit possible areas with opportunity for intervention by corroborating findings from EDA and
thematic analysis.
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Chapter 3 Overview of methods
A mixed-methods study was undertaken to characterise the nature and range of incidents reported fromgeneral practice in England and Wales, to identify priority issues for the development of patient safety
in primary care. The Aneurin Bevan University Health Board (ABHB) Research Risk Review Committee
classed the study as a service evaluation (ABHB research and development reference number: SA/410/13;
see Appendix 1). This chapter provides a detailed description of the methods used in the study.
Our analytical plan deviated from our original study protocol following support from the funder and
guidance provided by the study’s Professional Advisory Group (PAG), which comprised methodological
experts in qualitative and quantitative analysis, health-care organisational leaders and policy-makers. Given
the intrinsic biases of incident report data, largely the unknown denominator and minimal primary care
patient safety literature base to fill in the gaps generated by those uncertainties, the PAG advised us to use
EDA methods in preference to harm susceptibility ratios and network analyses to determine the key
relationships.42 The PAG proposed that the development of EDA methods for incident report analysis could
be more readily adopted by organisations seeking to make sense of their own local incident report data.
These methods have enabled us to achieve all study outcomes, which include development of a
classification system (objective 1) to generate a detailed description of primary care. Patient safety incidents
from general practice in England and Wales were characterised (objectives 2–4) to identify candidate areas
of development for patient safety in primary care (objective 5). Our recent outputs using these methods
have been accepted for publication in the journals Pediatrics, Vaccine and the British Journal of
General Practice.
Study method
Data source
The definition of a patient safety incident in the NRLS is ‘any unintended or unexpected incident that
resulted in or could have resulted in harm to one or more patients’.20 Reporting incidents that resulted in
severe harm or death of a patient became mandatory in June 2010; however, before this all reporting was
voluntary, and remains so for incidents resulting in no, low or moderate harm.
Health-care professionals have a duty to report incidents to health-care organisations’ incident management
systems. These are anonymised and uploaded to the NRLS. Each report contains structured categorical
information about location, patient demographics and reporter perception of severity of harm. This is
collected in a report that also contains unstructured free-text descriptions of the incident, potential
contributory factors and planned actions to prevent recurrence. The free-text description, where the reporter
is asked to describe what happened and why they think it happened, offers a rich body of qualitative data
for identification of areas for improvement. These descriptions provide insight into the harms occurring or
detected by HCPs working in general practice from their perspective.
Donaldson et al.43 have described the NRLS in detail, including its current management in England
and Wales.
Study design
We undertook a cross-sectional mixed-methods evaluation of reports that included a thematic analysis
informed by an EDA.44,45
Study setting
Incident reports were included from 571 different locations, such as health boards (formerly local health
boards) in Wales and clinical commissioning groups (formerly primary care trusts) in England.
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Sample selection
Incident reports received by the NRLS between April 2005 and September 2013 from general practice
were considered as the complete data set (n = 42,729 reports). Given the inductive and exploratory nature
of the study, we analysed all incidents resulting in severe harm or death and a random sample of 12,500
non-fatal reports. To ensure that results in our sample were current, a weighting was applied to the
random sample so that recent reports (from 2012 onwards) were given a higher priority than reports from
previous years (2005–11); increasing proportions from no harm, low harm and moderate harm were also
selected. Following removal of all reports with a severe level of harm and death, approximately 15%,
30% and 60% of each stratum were drawn using a simple random sample without replacement. The
probability of drawing a report from group 2 was twice the probability of drawing a report from group 1
(least recent and increasing proportions of level of harm, from no harm to moderate harm), and four times
more likely in group 3 (most recent and increasing proportions of level of harm, from no harm to
moderate harm) than in group 1; this resulted in a data set with 12,500 reports. The frequencies for each
combination can be seen in Table 1.
Classification system and reviewer training
The analysis of safety incident reports has largely been organised and managed using safety classification
systems called taxonomies.46–62 Several patient safety classifications were reviewed and considered for
inclusion,20,63–66 including those developed for general practice.7,65,67–70 These classification systems provided
considerable guidance for shaping the scope of the system needed; however, we did not judge that they
would support detailed coding of patient safety incidents from general practice. Therefore, we empirically
developed our own classification system to undertake a detailed description of incidents, including those
that are complex in nature, which involve a sequence of events that culminate in, and contribute to,
the incident.
We developed a classification system that incorporated multiple coding frameworks, and utilised existing
patient safety incident classification rules (see Appendix 2), to enable chronological coding (see Figure 1).71
Based on the WHO’s International Classification for Patient Safety (WHO ICPS),63 four independent classes
to describe the incident, its contributory factors, and type and level of harm were developed using an
iterative approach.71,72 The WHO ICPS descriptions of level of harm63 were used (see Appendix 3 for
examples of excerpts of the classification system codes).
A multidisciplinary team of clinicians were recruited as incident reviewers. Preparatory online modules on
patient safety provided by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement Open School were completed by all
reviewers. Next, a human factors expert delivered training in incident analysis, classification, root cause
analysis and human factors in health care and supported reviewers via weekly calls to undergo simulation
with a practice data set. During the training period, to focus reviewers on the relevant content of interest,
they were required to identify in each incident the criteria outlined in Figure 1. These criteria were
developed by content analysis of 500 randomly sampled incidents by a junior and senior investigator.
Framework development for each class was guided by a priori codes generated from pilot work.74
The reviewers’ interpretations were informed by tacit knowledge, clinical expertise and the human factors
TABLE 1 Study sample described by report period and level of harm
Reporting period Group Group size (n)
Level of harm
TotalNone Low Moderate
April 2005–9 1 17,238 2162 846 631 3639
2010–11 2 12,588 2237 894 770 3901
2012–September 2013 3 10,413 2292 1721 947 4960
TOTAL 6691 3461 2348 12,500
OVERVIEW OF METHODS
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training received to guide sensemaking, defined as ‘the active process of assigning meaning to ambiguous
data’, in order to identify the learning that can be used to inform improvements in clinical care.75,76 Once
> 70% agreement (kappa statistic) between reviewers and an experienced coder (HW) was achieved, the
reviewers were eligible to code the study data.
Coding management system
To ensure that our process was replicable for health-care organisations to consider adopting the
classification system, we decided not to use an existing qualitative data analysis management software tool.
In addition, given the distributed and international nature of the project (members of the research team in
the UK, the USA and Australia), we developed a bespoke solution to support the iteration of frameworks
and provide secure access to numerous concurrent reviewers regardless of geographical location. The
system comprised a back-end database system and a web-based portal. The back-end database was built on
Microsoft SQL Server 2014 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA), with custom SQL algorithms to
provide, for example, live concordance checks of reviewers’ double-coding. The web front end was
produced using a customised version of Portofino 4.1.1 (Many Designs, Genoa, Italy), an open-source web
framework written in JavaScript (Netscape Communications Corporation, Mountain View, CA, USA).
Data analysis
There were three stages of analysis:
l stage 1: familiarisation and data coding, which involved reading the free text of the report and
applying codes to describe incident type, potential contributory factors and level and type of harm
l stage 2: generation of data summaries, using EDA methods
l stage 3: interpretation of themes and learning; seeking to understand the most commonly identified
patient safety incidents, events leading up to incidents and reported contributory factors, and the
contexts within which they occurred.
Each stage will now be considered in more detail.
Who
1.1. Who is reporting the incident?
1.2. Which member(s) of staff were involved?
1.3. Were people in the situation aware that there was a problem?
Where/when
3.1. In which area of health care did something go wrong?
Why
4.1. Is there an identifiable cause to the problem?
4.2. Could this harm have been predicted?
Preventing reoccurence
5.1. How could the harm have been prevented?
5.2. Has anything been learned from the situation?
5.3. Have measures been put in place to prevent reoccurrence?
What
2.1. What happened, or what was the problem?
2.2. What was the outcome for the patient in this incident?
2.3. Was there a risk inherent in the clinical situation (e.g. medication adverse event)?
2.4. Is this an isolated incident or is it wider problem?
FIGURE 1 Criteria for orientation to incident report content. Reproduced with permission from Carson-Stevens et al.73
This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0)
license, which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt and build upon this work, for commercial use, provided the
original work is properly cited. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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Stage 1: data familiarisation and coding
Reviewers orientated themselves to the content by reading the incident report, which comprised several
structured categorical variables and three unstructured categories of free-text data. The reviewer was
required to objectively choose the codes, with no inferences made, that represented the content described
in each report from the four classes: incident type, contributory factors and type and degree of harm. The
nine rules for applying the Australian Patient Safety Foundation ‘recursive model for incident analysis’71
(see Appendix 2) were used to guide chronological ordering of coded data (Figure 2).
Coding large data sets required effective teamwork in order to utilise the tacit knowledge and experience
of multiple coders.77 To ensure validity and reliability of coding throughout the study, regular intercoder
reliability checks were undertaken on a 20% random sample of each reviewer’s coding quota for every
250 reports coded.78 Kappa statistics were calculated for each principal incident type, defined as the
incident that occurred just before the harm or potential harm. A kappa of > 0.7 was sought and is
consistent with previous studies of a similar nature.66 The reviewers met to discuss discordant reports and
where discrepancies could not be resolved by discussion between reviewers, third-person arbitration was
sought from a senior investigator (ACS).78
Learning from discussions about discordance was shared at weekly coding meetings and informed the
inductive amendment of codes and their definitions throughout the study process. The study team
comprised professionals from medicine, nursing, physiotherapy and mixed-methods researchers, and also
benefited from the participation of a pharmacist and dentist present via teleconference. A human factors
expert attended weekly meetings and advised the team on classification development and analysis of
complex incident reports. These meetings were also used to discuss intercoder agreement and attempted to
resolve any issues that related to the understanding and application of specific codes, as well as for wider
discussion among a multidisciplinary team. Ideally, a code book (a collection of coding classes) should be ‘all
inclusive’ with codes with definitions that are ‘mutually exclusive’.79 When an existing code was not available
to describe the incident characteristics, at the weekly coding meetings, the study team discussed whether a
new code was needed or the definition of an existing code should be amended to be more inclusive.
Hypotheses emerged from each step of analysis and were noted by reviewers during coding and analysis
via electronic memos that were also discussed at weekly coding meetings. For example, as codes were
assigned (e.g. ‘wrong dose administered’ and ‘wrong drug administered’) and the code book was
developed, the study team observed how cases clustered around particular codes or sets of related codes
Time
Wrong vaccine 
administered
Primary incident type
Records not up to date
Contributory incident
Why?
Resulted in
Red book unavailable
Contributory incident
Looked-after
child
Contributory factor
Why?
Resulted in
Why?
Resulted in
FIGURE 2 Example of codes from the classification system using the recursive model for incident analysis.
Reproduced with permission from Carson-Stevens et al.73 This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance
with the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) license, which permits others to distribute,
remix, adapt and build upon this work, for commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited.
See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. This figure was based on the work of Hibbert P, Runciman W,
Deakin A. A Recursive Model of Incident Analysis. Adelaide, SA: Australian Patient Safety Foundation; 2007.71
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and thematic groups emerged, such as ‘administration errors’, which informed the development of each
class.80 Implications of changes to the code book were considered on a case-by-case basis; given the
structured nature of the coding process, it was possible to isolate reports that would be impacted by new
codes or changes to the definition of existing codes.
Stage 2: generation of descriptive summaries
We described and summarised the data, in order for them to inform hypothesis formation. The analysis
aimed to describe the most frequent incident types, contributory factors and incident outcomes. Moreover,
the analysis explored high-level associations among these features. The nature of our inquiry was inductive
and was guided by clinical expertise. Therefore, EDA methods were used to produce, for example,
frequency tables, cross-tabulations and bar charts, ready for interpretation and refinement through expert
clinical guidance.42 As the purpose of our study was to generate learning to support HCPs to improve the
safety of care delivery, we recognised that it was essential for the outcomes of the EDA to be both
accessible and provide a logical account of how we identified the priority issues for possible intervention.
Frequency tables enabled us to identify the most common and most harmful reported incident types.
Cross-tabulations between data variables (e.g. age group, incident type, contributory factor and incident
outcomes), and between incident codes and contributory factor codes, helped to identify priorities
(e.g. vaccine errors in children) and clusters of reported contributory events or factors for further inquiry
by thematic analysis.
Stage 3: interpretation of themes and learning
The purpose of our thematic analysis44 was to deepen the analysis and interpretation gained in stage 1
(description of characteristics of incidents) and stage 2 (identifying patterns in the data) to identify and
prioritise the most important patient safety problems. Thematic analysis enabled identification and
description of recurring themes, not captured by the quantitative data, that could be targeted to
mitigate events.
Exploratory data analysis enabled us to collate relevant codes and explore the relationships between
the most common and most harmful reported safety incidents and contributory factors and outcomes.
Re-examination of these incidents in clusters of similar incidents provided an opportunity to identify
contextual issues within each subset of data (e.g. all reports describing moderate harms or worse following
issues relating to access of clinical services for urgent assessment). The subsets of reports were
independently reread by two clinicians. The clinician reviewers were encouraged to identify any relevant
clinical contextual issues that might not have been explicit in the report that could help explain the
relationships identified from the EDA in more detail. At this stage, interpretation of report content and the
identification of stand-alone and cross-cutting themes about reported causes and opportunities to prevent
recurrence within the data were encouraged. Themes and their supporting data, including clinical
vignettes, were discussed by the study team and recommendations were agreed.
Ethics considerations
The ABHB Research Risk Review Committee waived ethics approval (ABHB research and development
reference number SA/410/13; see Appendix 1). No issues were identified from the information within
reports that raised serious professionalism or ongoing patient safety issues.
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Chapter 4 Overview of study findings
In this chapter, we provide a summary of our analysis of all included incident reports and discuss the reportsthat have been excluded from the analysis in the interests of highlighting how the incident-reporting system
is misused or the purpose of the system is misinterpreted. In Chapter 5, we summarise all reports describing
serious harms and deaths, and describe inherent themes relating to the underlying reported preventable
causes of such incidents. In Chapter 6, we will explore each of the five categories of safety incident outlined
in Chapter 5. Recommendations for research and development are proposed in Chapter 7.
Overview
A total of 13,699 reports from general practice were coded. Five high-level, incident-type categories
summarise the majority of safety incidents described within the reports:
l communication with and about patients
l timely diagnosis and assessment
l medication and vaccine provision
l errors in investigative processes
l treatment and equipment provision.
Of the 9031 reports included in the analysis, the severity of harm could be determined in 5755 cases.
This was unclear for the remainder (n = 3276 incidents). Table 2 shows the number of incidents for each
category of harm severity and also gives an example of an incident with different levels of severity of harm.
Just over half of the included reports (50.3%, n = 4545) described harm to one or more patients.
TABLE 2 Examples, description and number of reports by severity of harm
Severity
of harm Description Example
Reports,
n (%)
Unclear It is unclear from the free-text description
what level of harm has occurred
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy, but no mention of an
allergic reaction
3276 (36.3)
None Patient outcome is not symptomatic or no
symptoms detected and no treatment is
required
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy, but did not develop an
allergic reaction
1210 (13.4)
Low Patient outcome is symptomatic, symptoms are
mild, loss of function or harm is minimal or
intermediate but short term, and no or minimal
intervention (e.g. extra observation, investigation,
review or minor treatment) is required
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy and developed a minor
rash which did not require any additional
treatment
3549 (39.3)
Moderate Patient outcome is symptomatic, requiring
intervention (e.g. additional operative procedure
or additional therapeutic treatment), an
increased length of stay, or causing permanent
or long-term harm or loss of function
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy and required hospital
admission for further treatment and
observation
631 (7.0)
Severe Patient outcome is symptomatic, requiring
life-saving intervention or major surgical/
medical intervention, shortening life
expectancy or causing major permanent or
long-term harm or loss of function
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy and subsequently had an
anaphylactic reaction requiring intubation
and admission to intensive care
122 (1.4)
Death On balance of probabilities, death was caused
or brought forward in the short term by the
incident
Patient given medication to which they had a
documented allergy and subsequently had an
anaphylactic reaction from which they died
243 (2.7)
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Severity of harm by incident category
Table 3 reports the number and proportion of incidents in each category and the proportions resulting in
no harm, harm or serious harm (all incidents resulting in moderate harm, severe harm or death).
Incidents related to communication with and about patients were most frequently reported safety issues
(n = 2805, 21%), followed by incidents related to medications and vaccines (n = 2484, 18%) and
investigative processes (n = 1339, 10%). Incidents relating to timely diagnosis and assessment (n = 728,
5%) and treatment and equipment provision (n = 754, 6%) were less frequently reported. However,
diagnosis and assessment-related incidents were most likely to cause harm to the patient; although 79%
of incidents in this category resulted in a harmful outcome, two out of three of all harmful outcomes were
serious harms or deaths (n = 366, 50%). This was followed by incidents relating to treatment and care
equipment (68%, n = 515), and then medications and vaccines (52%, n = 1280). Although
communication with, and about, the patient was the most frequently reported incident category, 46%
(n = 1282) of these incidents resulted in harm and 6% (n = 172) resulted in serious harm or death.
Reporting locations
Although 462 separate locations provided at least one report, over half of the reports originated from only
30 locations (n = 7071, 52%). Sixty-seven locations reported only one incident. Figure 3 demonstrates the
variation in reporting across locations. This implies that some organisations do not report general practice
safety incidents to the NRLS or do not have a mechanism for receiving local incident-reporting system from
general practice in its organisation. The top reporting location (shown in black) reported 920 incidents, of
which 26% (n = 243) resulted in harm and 4% (n = 40) in serious harm. Other locations are similar to the
organisation in blue where, of the 368 incidents reported, over half (60%, n = 219) resulted in harm.
Where they do report, different thresholds for receiving reports (i.e. only serious harms or deaths), as well
as different mechanisms or thresholds for uploading incident reports to the NRLS, could explain the
variation identified (see Figure 3).
TABLE 3 Number and proportion of incidents in each category by the severity of harm
Incident category Harm, n (%)
No harm,
n (%)
Serious harm
or death, n (%)
Harm not
specified, n (%) Total, n (%)
Communication with and
about patients
82 (46) 463 (17) 172 (6) 1061 (38) 2805 (21)
Medications and vaccines 1280 (52) 425 (17) 238 (10) 779 (31) 2484 (18)
Investigative processes 536 (40) 84 (6) 38 (3) 719 (54) 1339 (10)
Treatment and equipment
provision
515 (68) 64 (9) 116 (15) 175 (23) 754 (6)
Diagnosis and assessment 575 (79) 33 (5) 366 (50) 120 (17) 728 (5)
No harm from primary
care (excluded reports)
4668 (34)
Othera 921 (7)
TOTAL 13,699 (100)
a Not broken down by level of harm.
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FIGURE 3 Scattergraph of the percentage of harmful incidents by the frequency of reports per location.
Reported age of patients
The age of the patient was provided in 6472 incident reports. Figure 4 demonstrates the frequency of reports
by age group. The age group accounting for the highest proportion of incident reports was 76–85 years
(n = 1403, 22%), and 53% (n = 3417) of all reports involved a patient aged > 65 years while 9% (n = 576)
involved patients aged < 4 years. The frequency distribution of incident reports shows peaks at both extremes
of age (children and elderly patients), consistent with the expected number of contacts with general practice
in these age groups. This pattern was apparent across all the incident categories (see Chapter 6).
In 2574 cases, both the level of harm and patient age were reported. Figure 5 demonstrates the clustered
frequencies of each level of harm outcome per age group. Figure 5 also shows that those aged > 65 years
feature most within incident reports describing serious harms (moderate harm or worse). The age group
with the highest proportion of reports that resulted in serious harm was the 66–75 years age group (24%).
Reported contributory factors
In total, 4862 contributory factors, defined as issues that did not directly cause, but contributed to,
the occurrence of an incident, were identified. Only around one-third of incident reports described
reasons why the incident occurred, which significantly inhibits learning to improve future practice.
Staff-related factors (n = 1792) were most frequently identified, followed by service- (n = 1505) and
patient-related factors (n = 1383). A breakdown of those classes is included in Table 4 for patient- and
staff-related factors, and Table 5 for equipment- and service-related contributory factors.
Although staff mistakes, defined as a deficiency or failure in judgement or inferential processes, were
described in 986 reports, additional information that could yield any insight into ways to improve future
practice was minimal. However, reports describing failures in staff decision-making processes (n = 806)
included failure to follow protocols (n = 460) such as for international normalised ratio (INR) monitoring or an
inadequate skill set or knowledge (n = 266), for example relating to patients at risk of acute deterioration.
Unavailability or inadequate protocols (n = 520), pressures from low staffing levels (n = 420) and operational
challenges to ensure continuity of care (n = 412) were the most common service-related contributory factors
(see Table 4 for further details). Lack of familiarity of different staff member roles was also described in
53 reports.
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TABLE 4 Summary of patient- and staff-related contributory factors
Contributory factors
Contributory factor
subtheme
Examples of frequently described
contributory factors Total (n)
Patient-related factors
(N = 1383)
Patient characteristics
(n = 1051)
Patient pathophysiology 127
Patient is a child 89
Patient frailty 83
Rare disease or rare presentation 69
Language or patient
decision-making
(n = 258)
Patient behaviour 117
Non-compliance with instructions from HCPs 82
Patient speaks a language other than English 21
Geography (n = 74) Patient new to area 51
Access difficulties 12
Staff-related factors
(N = 1792)
Staff decision-making
(n = 806)
Failure to follow protocol 460
Inadequate skill set or knowledge 266
Wrong professional carries out task 44
Mistake (n = 986) Not otherwise specified 552
Misread/did not read 96
Distraction/oversight 25
TABLE 5 Summary of equipment- and service-related contributory factors
Contributory factors
Contributory factors
subtheme
Examples of frequently described
contributory factors Total (n)
Equipment-related
factors (N = 182)
Design and usability
(n = 142)
Poor equipment design 110
Inadequate medication storage or packaging 32
Service-related factors
(N = 1505)
Inadequate protocols
(n = 520)
Investigation-related protocols 155
Medication-related protocols 87
Referral-related protocols 82
Continuity of care
(n = 412)
Out-of-hours services 98
Transfer of information between secondary
and primary care
86
Continuity of care within primary care 59
Working conditions
(n = 420)
Inadequate provision of health-care staff 261
Busy/overloaded by work 126
Education and training
(n = 95)
Knowledge of others’ roles 53
Service availability
(n = 58)
Long wait for service 37
Service unavailable 21
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The patient-related factors included the physical and physiological characteristics of children and elderly
people, as well as behaviour-related issues such as compliance. Several patient groups were discussed in
terms of their potentially vulnerable status, particularly those with pre-existing pathophysiology or disability
(n = 127), children (n = 89) and the frail elderly (n = 83). Non-compliance with instructions from HCPs
(n = 82) was described in a small number of incidents.
Excluded reports
Around one in five reports (n = 3147, 23%) contained insufficient detail or did not describe a patient
safety incident, defined as ’any unintended or unexpected incident which could have led (or did lead) to
harm for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded healthcare’.20 Of note, although pressure ulcers can
represent the outcome of poor care, the majority of reports relating to pressure ulcers contained little
descriptive or contextual information or had not occurred in the community setting (e.g. incident report
simply stated ‘pressure ulcer, grade 3′) and were therefore also excluded from the analysis. Table 6 shows
a summary of excluded reports.
National Reporting and Learning System data limitations
One of our study objectives was to describe characteristics of the patient and incident such as gender,
ethnicity, geography, time of day, and level of patient harm. Rather than amend our objectives as a result
of various limitations, we have included them in order to highlight opportunities to improve the quality of
data uploaded to the NRLS.
l Gender is inconsistently provided as a structured variable to the NRLS and present in < 40% of reports.
l Ethnicity is not captured via a structured classification system.
l Time of day is an inconsistent and unstructured variable that can be identified by free-text analysis;
we have therefore highlighted where it is important as a contextual issue.
TABLE 6 Summary of excluded reports
Reason for exclusion Frequency
Inappropriate use of system
Irrelevant – did not describe a patient safety incident 784
Insufficient detail – report did not contain sufficient detail about what happened 810
Incident not related to health care, for example a fall in the GP surgery car park or patient has self-harmed
despite appropriate intervention from GP
762
Defensive reporting – reporting system being used by professionals to defend their involvement in events
other than a safety incident
97
Reporting death – a patient death with no apparent health-care-related cause was reported 233
Act of violence by patient – violence from a patient to HCPs 105
Complaint/coroner investigation – detail about a complaint and the need for, or outcome of, a coroner
investigation
118
Outcomes from secondary care or unclear
Pressure ulcer – grade of pressure ulcer stated but no description of how it occurred within community 1703
Health-care-associated infection – a hospital-acquired infection 56
TOTAL 4668
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Chapter 5 Serious harms and death in
general practice
In this chapter, we provide a summary of all reports describing serious harm and deaths in incidentreports received from general practice.
Overview
Of the total 13,699 incident reports, 996 incidents resulted in moderate or severe harm to, or death of, a
patient. Moderate and severe harms, using the WHO ICPS definitions,63 were considered to be permanent
loss of function, conditions necessitating hospital admission or disability. We called these serious harms.
An overview of level of harm outcome by incident category is provided in Table 7.
Priority contributory themes
Fewer than half of the 996 reports (n = 431, 43%) contained descriptions of contributory factors.
Combined with insights generated by thematic analysis, the four main contributory themes underpinning
serious harm- and death-related incidents were:
1. communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients
2. physician decision-making
TABLE 7 Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death
Incident category (N, % of total) Incident type Serious harm or death, n
Diagnosis and assessment
(N = 366, 37%)
Diagnosis 217
Assessment 149
Medication and vaccine provision
(N = 238, 24%)
Adverse event 63
Prescribing 45
Clinical decision-making 26
Dispensing 24
Monitoring 22
Administration 15
Immunisation-related 12
Provision of treatment and care equipment
(N = 116, 12%)
Treatment 89
Equipment 27
Communication with and about patients
(N = 172, 21%)
Referrals 70
Accessing clinical services 60
Information transfer 22
Miscommunication 18
Inaccurate knowledge about patients 2
Investigative processes (N = 38, 4%)
Others (N = 66, 7%) Transporting patients 20
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3. delays in cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom presentation and/or inadequate
administration
4. delayed management or mismanagement following failures to recognise signs of clinical (medical,
surgical and mental health) deterioration.
Table 8 highlights the proportion of serious harms and death outcomes by each theme.
Factors contributing to incidents describing serious harm
and death
In this section, we provide a summary of the contributory factors identified in all serious harm and death reports.
Patient-related factors were the most frequently reported (n = 215) contributors to incidents resulting in
serious harm and death. These included patient characteristics, such as patient pathophysiology (n = 51) or
frailty (n = 21). For example, one patient without a care package following discharge from hospital, and
with poor eyesight, self-administered the wrong dose of insulin. Rare presentations, such as for an atypical
cancer presentation, or a rare disease such as bladder cancer in a young child, may have made diagnosis
more challenging in 43 incidents. Service-related contributory factors were also frequently described
(n = 190). The out-of-hours primary care services (n = 48) were often implicated; for example, some
incidents were attributed to the failure of HCPs to share information. In one case, the out-of-hours service
failed to pass on urgent blood test results to the patient’s GP and thereby delayed further assessment.
Forty-one incidents were attributed to inadequate protocols; for example, inadequate protocols regarding
the handling of referrals by mental health teams resulted in some cases delays in assessment, and led to
deterioration in the patient’s mental health or death by suicide. Working conditions, such as staff being
TABLE 8 Summary of incident reports describing serious harm or death outcomes by priority contributory theme
Theme Harm (n)
Subtheme Moderate Severe Death Total
Communication errors in the referral and discharge of
patients complicated by failures in IT systems
72 11 17 100
Referral not performed when indicated 27 8 12 47
Premature and poor discharge planning 27 2 2 31
Information transfer between care providers 18 1 3 22
Physician decision-making 64 18 14 96
Prescribing 40 5 5 50
Treatment decisions 12 8 4 24
Monitoring 12 5 5 22
Delayed cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar
symptom presentation and/or inadequate assessment
30 42 21 93
Delayed management or mismanagement following
failures to recognise signs of clinical (medical, surgical
and mental health) deterioration
26 5 30 61
Errors in the process of triaging patients 14 1 13 28
Identifying acute clinical conditions 6 2 15 23
Diagnosis of emergency condition delayed 6 2 2 10
TOTAL 192 76 82 350
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too busy to spend sufficient time assessing a patient, were described in 17 reports. Staff-related factors
were described in 108 reports and included failure to follow protocols (n = 38), such as those for warfarin
dosing, and staff members having an inadequate skill set or knowledge to assess acutely unwell patients,
resulting in missed emergency diagnoses (n = 36).
Examination of priority themes
In this section, we will define each priority theme by considering the role of identified contributory factors,
and, when relevant, the events leading up to the incident, and other contextual issues identified by
thematic analysis.
Communication errors in the referral and discharge of patients
Errors in the processes involved in transferring patient information compromised the continuity of care
between primary and secondary care. The most frequently reported error, mentioned in 47 reports, was
the failure of referral to take place as intended. These resulted in delays in management for 18 patients
and in the death of 10 patients. For example:
Discharge home with pressure sore on sacrum and × 2 heels from [community hospital]. Unable to
mobilise and/or eat and drink – district nurse was not informed.
Errors relating to referrals not being made were sometimes preceded by another incident, including poor
discharge planning, for example failure to refer to community practitioners such as district nurses for
wound reviews (n = 10), missed diagnoses (n = 7) or failure to transfer patient information (n = 5), such as
failure to send patients’ discharge summaries to their GP.
Premature or incomplete discharge planning was described in a further 31 reports. In 27 cases this resulted in
the patient being readmitted to hospital; two patients died. One report described a frail elderly gentleman
who could not cope without additional support at home following discharge and, as a result of self-neglect,
developed cellulitis from leg wounds. He was eventually readmitted to hospital but later died. Of the 21
incidents in which patient age was reported, nearly three-quarters (n = 15) of patients were aged ≥ 66 years.
A further 22 incidents involved errors in the transfer of patient information between different health-care
settings, with 10 resulting in the patient’s admission to hospital. These included incomplete discharge
summaries (n = 5), failure to send discharge summaries (n = 5) and delay in sending discharge summaries
(n = 4). In four cases, the patient’s GP failed to action recommendations included in the discharge
summary. For example:
Patient attended GP appointment with a new resident GP. Enquired about the referral to urology
department at acute hospital that should have been made by the long-term locum GP 3 months
previous. On investigation, it was found unsent in the records.
Few contributory factors were reported in relation to incidents involving poor communication between
health-care providers. Of note, poor continuity of care between health-care providers was only explicitly
reported as a potential contributory factor in five cases.
Physician decision-making
In total, 96 incidents were identified as resulting from physician decision-making: 24 reports described
errors in the clinical treatment decision process, 50 reports described errors in prescribing medications and
22 recorded errors in monitoring dose-dependent medications. For example:
Patient discharged from [hospital] on [date]; no warfarin dose or INR results sent to GP. INR checked
and information added to INRstar (or did not enter dose was changed in hospital). Patient given 2 mg
daily (subsequently found dose in hospital was 0.5 mg). Patient suffered GI [gastrointestinal] bleed and
died on [date].
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Over half (n= 56, 58%) of the reports were preceded by another incident. The interface between physicians,
existing paper-based and/or computer-based systems and patients was the apparent underlying issue in a
number of these incidents. Errors in the transfer of patient information between health-care settings were
recorded in 17 reports, and errors in the process of recording, storing and accessing patient documentation in
a further seven reports. Inadequate communication with patients was described in eight reports. For example,
one report detailed a district nurse missing the opportunity to check the immunisation status of a patient;
the patient did not receive the required pneumococcal vaccine and subsequently developed pneumococcal
sepsis. In another example, the GP failed to act on discharge advice:
Practice notified that patient was being discharged following 10-day admission for treatment of
iatrogenic hypercalcaemia caused by a high dose of alfacalcidol. GP did not change dose of
alfacalcidiol as stated in letter.
At least one contributory factor was identified in over half (n = 54, 56%) of physician-related medication
errors. Twelve reports described how patient behaviour or actions contributed to the development of
incidents, for example non-compliance with instructions from the patient’s physician in some cases resulted
in adverse drug events and recurrence of the patient’s illness.
A further 15 incidents were due, at least in part, to staff members failing to follow protocols or having an
inadequate skill set or knowledge. For example, one GP prescribed 10 times the recommended dose of
trimethoprim for an 8-week-old baby. Service-related factors included poor continuity of care between
different HCPs (n = 8); for example, one patient received the wrong doses of insulin as a result of the lack of
communication between the discharging medical team and the district nurses. Four incidents arose, at least
in part, because the patient received care from an out-of-hours service. For example, one patient was
prescribed a large quantity of amitriptyline by an out-of-hours GP despite a history of overdose, and was
found dead 2 days later. This highlights the lack of background clinical information available to out-of-hours
service doctors when making clinical decisions. Of particular note, 17 adverse events followed an error in
the process of monitoring medications, of which 14 involved staff failing to follow protocol or having an
inadequate skill set or knowledge. This included one case in which a patient’s INR was not monitored
despite the patient being prescribed anti-tuberculosis medications known to interact with warfarin. The
patient subsequently developed a pontine cerebrovascular event and was found to have an INR of 10.
Another staff-related factor was mistakes in prescribing medications (n = 8), such as confusing drugs with
similar names or appearances. For example:
A locum GP diagnosed tonsillitis and prescribed [p]enicillamine instead of [p]enicillin. The patient was
unaware of the mistake and took the tablets as prescribed. He sought further medical advice as
symptoms were not improving.
Delays in cancer diagnosis associated with unfamiliar symptom presentation
and/or inadequate administration
Communication process errors commonly underpin missed and delayed cancer diagnoses. Missed or
delayed cancer diagnosis accounted for 9% (n = 93) of reports describing serious patient harm or death.
In 25 cases, these were preceded by an incident involving investigative processes, such as an error in
reporting of diagnostic imaging results. In 16 cases, communication process errors were preceded by a
referral error. For example, an elderly patient with an identified lung opacification on a chest radiograph
was given a routine rather than an urgent referral. By the time adenocarcinoma was diagnosed, the cancer
had metastasised and the patient developed carcinomatosis. Another 59 reports recorded a delay in the
assessment or management of a cancer diagnosis, and 18 of those described the death of a patient.
For example:
Patient attended surgery with symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome. Given prescription, over next few
months came back for telephone advice. Told had colitis and given further medication. Patient was not
given a PR [per rectal] examination at any visit. Referred to endoscopy 7 months later and found to
have bowel tumour. Patient undergoing chemotherapy at the time of report.
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In over half of incidents involving a delay in cancer diagnosis, the patient’s age was recorded (n = 24,
62%), and missed cancer diagnoses were reported for a broad range of age groups. Symptoms of a rare
presentation was the most common contributory factor for a delayed cancer diagnosis. Other factors
included non-disclosure of symptoms (n = 9) and visiting different HCPs for the same symptoms (n = 6).
For example:
Patient’s mother contacted the Patient Advice and Liaison Service, stating that her adult daughter
died. For 6 months prior to her daughter’s death, the GP had been treating her for migraine, anxiety,
depression and panic attacks. In addition, she had been losing her eyesight but the GP had insisted
that she see an optician who had referred her back to the GP, stating that something else was amiss.
The patient had been told that the GP was in touch with the optician. After the patient died, two
brain tumours were discovered.
Failures to recognise signs of clinical deterioration
Missed or delayed diagnosis of an acute clinical condition (n = 61) frequently resulted from errors during
telephone triage (n = 28), of which seven involved out-of-hours services. For example:
Call passed from NHS Direct to out-of-hours service with a ‘less urgent’ priority. 10-week-old baby
with central cyanosis, increased respiratory rate, and ‘noisy’ breathing.
Acute clinical conditions were missed in 23 reports, and a further 10 reports described the delayed
diagnosis of an emergency condition, such as bowel perforation, which resulted in a delayed hospital
admission and the death of a patient. Another example includes:
2-month-old baby taken to A&E [accident and emergency] as Sudden Unexpected Death of Infancy
having died at home. Baby had been seen by GP on previous evening with temperature of 38 Celsius;
diagnosed with possible chest infection and prescribed amoxicillin. NICE guidance states that fever
≥ 38 Celsius in child less than 3 months is a red flag and a child should be admitted to hospital.
Preliminary results from post-mortem suggest that infection is likely cause of death.
Involvement of out-of-hours services was described in 10 of these incidents. For example:
Patient seen on home visit. Advised had been seen with symptoms strongly suggestive of an acute
stroke at home by out-of-hours service at approximately 2015 hours yesterday evening and told to
contact her GP the next morning. Policy is that patient suspected of suffering an acute stroke should
be admitted as a 999 to hospital for appropriate diagnosis and treatment.
In eight cases, the HCP did not appreciate the severity of illness, leading to delays in escalating concerns
and co-ordinating urgent transport to hospital. Of the 36 reports that described emergency transport
delays, 10 stated that the delay was preceded by failures in triaging patients or in the assessment of
acutely unwell patients. In addition, four incidents were preceded by inadequate verbal communication
between HCPs.
Errors in the process of identifying patients at risk of deterioration as a result of mental health problems
were largely fatal, with 27 out of 29 incidents resulting in the death of a patient. The majority of these
involved the patient taking an overdose of medication. Patient behaviour, such as not attending a planned
review with their GP, contributed to these incidents in five cases.
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Chapter 6 Patient safety incidents in
general practice
In this chapter, we explore each of the five categories of safety incidents described in reports receivedfrom general practice and the inherent themes relating to the underlying reported causes.
The five categories of incident type, in descending order of frequency, are:
1. communication with and about patients
2. medication and vaccine provision
3. errors in investigative processes
4. treatment and equipment provision
5. timely diagnosis and assessment.
Communication with and about patients
Overview
Over one-fifth (n = 2805) of the reports described problems relating to communication with, and about,
patients. Five themes were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions of events and
contributory factors:
1. barriers to accessing clinical services
2. errors in information transfer between care providers
3. up-to-date patient records
4. delays in referral decision-making and administrative processes
5. miscommunication with patients and between professionals.
Barriers to accessing clinical services (n = 636) and delays in referral (n = 746) were the most frequent
incidents and were also associated with the most harm.
Table 9 provides an overview of themes and subthemes associated with levels of harm for
communication-related safety incidents.
Further examination of communication themes
Barriers accessing clinical services
Problems accessing clinical services were identified in 636 reports, and 65% of those described a harm
outcome. Reported incidents related to difficulties in arranging appointments with GPs, statutory
assessment services (e.g. ‘new-baby check’ or cervical smears), or for message handling by, or telephone
calls with, receptionists and delays in presentation or timely advice as a result of involvement of NHS Direct.
Barriers to accessing acute care services were the type of incident most likely to result in serious harm (n = 60).
Patients experienced difficulties or delays in accessing home visits or telephone call assessments with a
triage nurse or GP, or in securing a primary care appointment. In addition, reports described patients not
receiving visits from community-based HCPs, such as health visitors, because of a lack of information
transfer from secondary care. For example:
Notification of birth details not faxed through to surgery. Health visitor only aware on day 14 when
discharge summary faxed through to surgery. Discharge summary telephone number of client
incorrect. Midwife made aware by client but still no communication with Health visitor so no birth
visit scheduled.
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Errors in information transfer between care providers
Incidents arising from ineffective or inadequate transfer of clinical information from one provider to
another were identified in 756 reports. Over one-quarter of these incidents led to harm (n = 235, 31%),
and few incidents led to serious harm (n = 22). The majority of incidents occurred at the interface between
primary and secondary care (n = 621).
Reports described patients receiving letters intended for the GP from the hospital consultant, for example:
Copies of neurology results not sent with letter concerning serious diagnosis – instead, sent to direct
to patient. No details in letter as to further treatment or follow-up. Information and copy results
eventually obtained from secretary to consultant.
Some discharge and clinic letters were delayed, incorrect or incomplete, or indeed never sent, sometimes
after long and complex inpatient stays leading to primary care doctors and nurses struggling to make sense
of management plans. Often the error was identified before the patient experienced any harm,
for example:
Discharge summary had bisoprolol 10 mg daily and atenolol 50 mg daily (both beta-blockers).
Medication should have been bisacodyl tablets 10 mg and atenolol 50 mg. Patient went to see the
doctor 4 days later, blood pressure was low: 96/76.
TABLE 9 Themes and subthemes of communication-related incidents
Incident theme Harm, n (%)
Total (%)Subtheme Yes No Serious Not specified
Barriers to accessing clinical services 412 (65) 85 (13) 60 (9) 139 (22) 636 (100)
Message handling and telephone calls 24 9 3 16 49
Arranging appointments 88 37 3 42 167
Accessing a clinician 300 39 54 81 420
Errors in information transfer between care
providers
235 (31) 135 (18) 22 (3) 386 (51) 756 (100)
Communication not acted on 17 8 4 6 31
General transfer of information between
care providers
19 13 2 39 71
Information errors between secondary and
primary care
177 104 15 340 621
Information errors within primary care 22 10 1 1 33
Availability and accuracy of patient records 56 (15) 95 (26) 2 (1) 276 (74) 427 (100)
Availability of medical records 214 29 0 188 243
Accuracy of medical records 27 63 2 77 167
Other documentation 3 3 0 11 17
Delayed referrals 466 (62) 90 (12) 70 (9) 190 (25) 746 (100)
Delayed decision 213 29 34 64 306
Delayed referral 87 15 12 20 122
Erroneously completed referrals 27 20 2 25 72
Office-based errors 139 26 22 81 246
Miscommunication 113 (47) 58 (24) 18 (8) 69 (29) 240 (100)
With patients 78 36 11 38 152
Between HCPs 35 22 7 31 88
TOTAL 1282 463 172 1060 2805
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These incidents caused distress to patients and carers, and HCPs spent a lot of time mitigating possible
harmful clinical outcomes by chasing up the hospital team. Once errors occur, the consequences for the
patient can escalate quickly, as in the following example:
Discharge summary for patient received from ward on [Date]. Seven new medications on the discharge
summary with no indication why they were started. Contacted the ward and spoke to consultant. He
checked the notes and rang back the following day. He confirmed that the patient should not be
taking the medications and they were not prescribed in hospital. A new discharge summary was
agreed to be issued. We tried to contact the patient but he had been readmitted. Senior house officer
on the admitting ward confirmed the patient has been receiving the seven medications since
readmission. The patient is still in hospital.
Availability and accuracy of patient records
Reports describing unavailable or inaccurate patient records (n = 427, 15%) resulted in multiple
communication incidents. Around 10% of reports involved patients aged < 1 year, which perhaps reflects
the complexity of medical records for this age group, which include parent-held records (the Red Book),
GP surgery records and public health vaccine records. Inaccurate or unclear medical records were often
caused by filing errors (n = 58). For example:
Patient presented with stepmother for preschool booster. Written consent from father was brought
but parental held record was not available. Nurse explained she was giving REPEVAX and MMR
[measles, mumps and rubella]. The following day stepmother called expressing concern that MMR had
already been given in 2004. Incomplete documentation of initial dose of MMR booster.
Other reports described cases of patient notes being unavailable and thus delaying or hampering child
protection meetings or case conferences, and others reported that notes were unavailable because of IT
connection problems, highlighting IT system failure consequences:
A loss of IT connection due to a loose connection at a surgery resulted in two surgery sessions without
access to computer appointment or patient notes.
Delays in referral decision-making and administrative processes
Delayed referrals account for 40% of the described serious harm outcomes for all communication-related
incidents. Referrals were most commonly delayed by clinician decision-making (n = 306), or a clinician
forgetting to send referral letters or awaiting further information before doing so (n = 122). For example:
Dr failed to send 2-week-rule cancer referral for patient. The training implication has been addressed
with the doctor in the practice.
Erroneously completed referrals, either from primary to secondary care services or from secondary to
primary care, were described in 72 reports. Reports described practitioners’ confusion about the correct
referral method to select from several available (especially out of hours or at weekends and public
holidays). Ineffective protocols were identified as the most common contributory factor described in these
reports (n = 49). Across the reports, it was apparent that staff found it difficult to identify the appropriate
referral protocol or form or the correct fax number to use when sending referral letters:
Attended surgery [Date] with symptoms, which warranted a 2-week cancer referral (upper GI
[gastrointestinal] cancer). Secretary not at surgery Friday afternoon so form faxed by reception staff to fax
number on form. Secretary checking referrals [1 month later]+ noted no acknowledgement. Realised
wrong fax number on form. The number of the fax on the cancer referral form is now for a fax machine
in the Orthopaedic dept. Presumably they received the first fax but it wasn’t passed on or taken further.
As a result of these communication failures, patients did not receive medication (such as warfarin or
insulin), dressings were not changed and surgical wounds or pressure ulcers were left untended for days.
Failures to reinstate care packages also left vulnerable patients without basic care that led to a worsening
of their condition and readmission.
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Miscommunication with patients and between professionals
Reports in this theme could be divided into failures of communication between professionals and patients
(n = 152) and failures of communication between HCPs (n = 88). Around half of these incidents were
harmful (n = 113, 47%), and of these incidents one in six led to serious harm. For example, a patient was
given erroneous advice about insulin that could have resulted in a fatal outcome:
Patient sought advice from OOH [out of hours] about his insulin – his insulin pens had accidentally
been frozen and he was due to go away on holiday and needed to take meds with him. He was
advised to leave pens out for 1.5 hours and they would be OK.
Reports described doctors, nurses or reception staff giving patients incorrect advice with regards to taking
medication, where to attend for medical attention or how to access other services. This led to patients
being seen in an inappropriate setting, taking medication in incorrect doses or at an incorrect frequency,
or being unclear as to when they should seek attention in the event of deterioration. Others described a
lack of clear communication over the telephone or face to face between professionals with regard to how
seriously unwell a patient was and how urgently they needed to be assessed, leading to an inappropriate
delay in their assessment.
Medication and vaccine provision
Overview
Almost one-fifth of reports (n = 2484) described medication- and vaccine-related incidents. Five themes
were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions of events and contributory factors:
l safer medication provision
l reliable therapeutic drug-level monitoring processes
l avoidable adverse drug reactions
l immunisation-related errors for children, elderly and the immunocompromised
l clinician decision-making about treatments.
Table 10 provides an overview of themes and subthemes associated with described levels of harm for
medication- and vaccine-related incidents. The themes are also summarised by level of harm severity in a
clustered bar chart in Figure 6.
TABLE 10 Themes and subthemes of medication- and vaccine-related incidents
Theme Harm, n (%)
Total (%)Subtheme Yes No Serious Not specified
Safer medication provision 559 (38) 327 (22) 84 (6) 543 (40) 1429 (100)
Prescribing 293 181 45 289 763
Dispensing 143 94 24 172 409
Administering 123 52 15 82 257
Therapeutic drug monitoring 79 (65) 9 (8) 22 (18) 32 (27) 120 (100)
Avoidable adverse drug reaction 130 (94) 2 (1) 63 (45) 7 (5) 139 (100)
Immunisation-related errors 321 (69) 32 (7) 12 (3) 111 (24) 464 (100)
Prescribing 9 4 1 3 16
Dispensing 4 4 0 5 13
Administering 267 20 1 99 386
Other 41 4 10 4 49
Clinician decision-making 70 (58) 18 (15) 26 (21) 33 (27) 121 (100)
Other 121 (57) 37 (18) 31 (15) 53 (25) 211 (100)
TOTAL 1280 425 238 779 2484
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Prescribing incidents were most frequently described (n= 763, 31% of all medication- and vaccine-related
incidents), followed by dispensing incidents (n = 409, 16%) and immunisation-related errors (n = 464, 19%).
Avoidable adverse drug reactions were less common (n = 139), although they were the reports with the
highest proportion of serious harm (n = 63, 45%).
Warfarin (n = 59) and opiates (n = 21) were the drugs most often described in reports; inadequate
monitoring or hospital admissions as a result of avoidable complications were described as contributory
factors. Opiate-related incidents were often related to drug-seeking behaviour, unintentional drug
overdoses or failure to treat symptoms in palliative care patients in a timely manner. Other drugs described
in reports are summarised in Figure 7.
Further examination of medication and vaccine themes
Safer medication provision: prescribing
Prescribing errors were the most frequent (n = 763, 31%) of all medication- and vaccine-related incidents;
they included prescribing the wrong dose (n = 226) or even the wrong medication (n = 151). Illegible
prescriptions, wrong formulations and prescription of wrong routes of administration were also reported.
The most frequent events preceding a prescribing-related incident were errors of administration (n = 99,
43% of such reports), documentation (n = 36, 16%) or communication (n = 39, 17%). Errors in transfer of
information from secondary to primary care were described in 90 reports; this was often because of a
delay in receiving the information or incomplete/inaccurate information.
Staff mistakes were the most frequently described contributory factor and were linked to other
contributing factors such as IT failures (n = 17, 4%), disruptions to continuity of care (n = 51, 11%)
and non-adherence to protocols for repeat prescribing (n = 26, 5%). Being a child made up 7% (n = 34)
of described patient-related contributory factors, and was also associated with non-continuity of care
and staff failure to follow protocol.
Safer medication provision: dispensing
Dispensing errors were described in 409 reports (15% of all medication- and vaccine-related incidents).
The wrong drug was described in 114 reports (29% of dispensing-related reports), and seven reports
described serious harm outcomes. The wrong dose of medication dispensed was the next most frequent
incident type (n = 91, 22%), and nine of those incidents resulted in serious harm outcomes.
Descriptions of staff mistakes featured often (n = 84), and 32 reports identified confusion between similar
medication names, such as Buccastem® (Alliance Pharmaceuticals Limited, Chippenham, UK) and
bisoprolol; trazodone and tramadol; amisulpride and amitriptyline; and pregabalin and Pregaday®
(Wülfing Pharma GmbH, Gronau, Germany). For example:
53-year old man dispensed trazodone 50 mg instead of tramadol 50 mg, sticker said tramadol on the
trazodone box. Patient saw GP 5 days later complaining of dry mouth, blurred vision and feeling
‘spaced out’.
Safer medication provision: administering
Errors in the administering of drugs or vaccines (including oxygen) were described in 257 reports (9% of all
medication- and vaccine-related incidents). Failure to administer medication at the correct time was the
most frequently described error (n = 53, 21%), with five reports describing serious harm outcomes,
including one patient death. For example:
The nurse in a nursing home left the enoxaparin injection on the bedside table in preparation to inject
the patient but the patient administered it orally because she thought it was analgesia.
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Administration of the wrong dose of medication was the next most frequent type of incident (n = 62, 24%
of administration-related incidents) with seven of those reports describing serious harm outcomes and one
resulting in death. Cases of administration of the wrong medication (n = 44, 17%) or at the wrong time
(n = 41, 16%) were also reported.
Prior incidents that led to an administering error included a prescribing error (n = 21), inability to access a
HCP (n = 10) and poor communication between HCPs and patients (n = 13). Reported contributory factors
included staff mistakes (n = 60), including distraction (n = 9) or misreading labels (n = 12) and similar
medication names (n = 7); and staff failure to follow protocol (n = 11); inadequate skill set/knowledge
(n = 6); and patient behaviour factors (n = 9), including non-compliance.
Reliable therapeutic drug-level monitoring
Incidents related to therapeutic drug monitoring were described in 120 reports (only 4% of all medication- and
vaccine-related incidents); 22 reports described serious harm and included five patient deaths. Subthemes
identified included monitoring not commenced (n= 24) and doses not adjusted following monitoring (n = 12);
warfarin was the most frequently involved drug (n= 17) and resulted in two patient deaths.
Prior incidents that led to drug monitoring-related incidents included inadequate transfer of information from
secondary to primary care (n = 11), referrals not made when appropriate (n = 5) and miscommunication
between the HCP and the patient (n = 6). In contrast to other medication incidents, staff mistakes rarely
contributed to therapeutic drug monitoring incidents, being cited in only two such reports. Staff failing to
follow protocol was described in 12 reports, for example failure to request a repeat INR for a patient when a
new treatment was commenced. Inadequate organisational protocols contributed to 13 incidents, of which
six related to protocols about transferring patients between secondary and primary care. Patient factors
were also reported (n = 19), 10 of which resulted from patient non-compliance. Several reports made
reference to patients on warfarin who were non-compliant with monitoring. Some reports described the
ethical issues doctors faced, knowing that withdrawal of treatment would also put the patient at risk of
life-threatening events such as pulmonary embolism or stroke.
Avoidable adverse drug reactions
Avoidable adverse drug reactions were described in 139 reports (6% of all medication- and vaccine-related
incidents), and 63 of those (45%) resulted in serious harm outcomes, with 10 reports recording patient
death. For example:
Patient was given a script by a community matron for Oramorph[®, Boehringer Ingelheim Limited,
Bracknell, UK] 2.5 ml 4–6 hourly as required but the label on the bottle said take 2.5 5-ml spoons,
result in a total of 12.5 ml. This is five times the prescribed amount on the script. The patient had
three doses over 12 hours and passed away at 6.00 a.m.
Twenty-six reports described patient-related contributory factors, such as pre-existing pathophysiology
and frailty; seven reports involved patients with known allergies and 22 related to patients on drugs
that necessitated patient monitoring (not mutually exclusive). Warfarin was the most frequently involved
medication, and 16 reports described a serious outcome resulting in hospital admission, for example
epistaxis, vaginal bleeding, haemoptysis or cerebrovascular accident.
Immunisation-related errors for children, the elderly and the immunocompromised
Immunisation-related incidents were described in 464 reports (19% of all medication- and vaccine-related
incidents). The majority concerned vaccine administration (n = 386, 83%) and resulted in low harm,
although three deaths were reported, and two incidents related to the pneumococcal vaccine not being
administered at the appropriate time. Incidents in which either the wrong vaccine was administered
(n = 138, 30%) or the wrong number of doses were administered (n = 122, 26%) were also recorded.
Incidents relating to administration of the wrong number of doses often involved children and occurred
because the medical documentation was inaccurate and not checked, resulting in the child receiving an
additional, unnecessary, vaccine that could potentially cause an adverse event.
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Immunisation administration errors involving medical records (n = 49) included discrepancies in GP records
or personal records (Red Book) and/or other child-health records. Frequent contributory factors were staff
mistakes (n = 105), for example staff unaware of the new immunisation programme, staff confusing
vaccinations with similar names or staff not checking the medical records, resulting in administration of a
vaccine that was not indicated.
Clinician decision-making about treatments
Issues underpinned by clinician decision-making about treatments in acute and chronic situations were
described in 121 reports (4% of the total medication- and vaccine-related incidents), with 24 reports
recording serious harm outcomes including four patient deaths. Specifically, these reports described no
treatment given (n = 37), insufficient treatment given (n = 19) and the wrong treatment given (n = 16).
See examples in Box 1.
A range of incidents preceded clinician decision-making errors, including inaccurate medical records
(n = 6); poor discharge planning (n = 3); and delays in responding to results (n = 3). These low numbers
perhaps reflect the fact that reasons for errors in clinical decision-making are multifactorial. Lack of
continuity of care was the most frequently cited issue (n = 18), and was attributed to issues with
out-of-hours care (n = 5), lack of communication between secondary and primary care (n = 2) and locum
staff (n = 3). Within reports, poor communication between HCPs that contributed to the GP not seeing the
‘whole patient’ was a frequent cross-cutting issue.
Errors in investigative processes
Overview
A total of 1339 reports described safety issues related to clinical investigations. Four themes were evident
from synthesis of the reported descriptions and contributory factors:
1. ordering incorrect investigations to inform differential diagnosis
2. practical and administrative barriers for collection and transfer of specimens
3. administrative failures leading to delays, wrong results or failure to receive results
4. misinformed clinical decision-making and incorrectly interpreted investigative results.
BOX 1 Examples of clinician decision-making errors about treatments
Example 1
A patient with central chest pain radiating to her jaw saw the GP (after ECG), who wrote a letter querying a MI
and sent the patient home to pack a bag and wait for the ambulance. He noted in the letter that the patient
lived alone and had no help. When the ambulance arrived, the patient was packing a bag in her bedroom still
suffering chest pain. She had received no medications and was thrombolysed in her bedroom. She was then
transferred to a CCU.
Example 2
A patient with poorly controlled asthma visited a GP who did not change treatment or provide any steroids,
resulting in respiratory arrest and resuscitation.
Example 3
A GP arranged for CTPA of an outpatient basis. The patient received no treatment while awaiting a CTPA,
contrary to definitive guidelines for outpatient management.
CCU, critical care unit; CTPA, computed tomography pulmonary angiography; ECG, electrocardiography;
MI, myocardial infarction.
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Table 11 provides an overview of each theme and the harm outcomes described in reports. There were
few reports of serious harm (n = 38, 3% of investigative process-related incidents). Practical and
administrative barriers to the collection and transfer of specimens were implicated in 866 reports (66%);
of these, mislabelling clinical samples accounted for the majority of incidents (n = 486, 56%).
TABLE 11 Themes and subthemes of investigative process-related incidents
Theme Frequency, n (%)
Subtheme Harm
No
harm
Serious
harm
Not
specified Total
Ordering incorrect investigations to inform
differential diagnosis
66 (61) 10 (9) 7 (6) 32 (30) 108 (100)
Wrong diagnostic imaging test ordered or not ordered 15 6 3 10 31
Wrong investigation ordered or not ordered 51 4 4 22 77
Practical and administrative barriers for collection
and transfer of specimens
279 (32) 44 (5) 8 (1) 543 (56) 866 (100)
Mislabelled request form 4 2 0 25 31
Mislabelled sample 123 26 2 337 486
Errors in the process of obtaining or processing a
laboratory specimen
121 12 3 140 273
Errors in the process of obtaining or processing of a
diagnostic image
11 3 1 17 31
Errors in the process of obtaining or processing of
other diagnostic investigation
5 0 0 1 6
Lost specimens 5 0 1 7 12
Other 10 1 1 16 27
Administrative failures leading to delays, wrong
results or failure to receive results
109 (45) 22 (9) 9 (4) 109 (45) 240 (100)
Error in the process of physician receiving accurate
laboratory test results including errors of delay
77 19 6 77 173
Error in the process of physician receiving accurate
diagnostic imaging test results including errors of delay
27 1 3 23 51
Error in the process of physician receiving accurate
other test results including errors of delay
5 2 0 9 16
Misinformed clinical decision-making and incorrectly
interpreted results
82 (66) 8 (6) 14 (11) 35 (28) 125 (100)
Response to a laboratory result 63 6 10 25 94
Response to a routine laboratory result 3 0 2 4 7
Response to imaging result 7 1 2 4 12
Response to drug level 3 1 0 2 6
Response to other investigations 6 0 0 0 6
TOTAL 536 84 38 719 1339
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Further examination of investigative process themes
Ordering correct investigations to inform the differential diagnosis
Diagnoses were often delayed or missed because of mistakes in the investigative process. The wrong
laboratory test was ordered, or not ordered at all, when it would have been appropriate, in 77 reports.
In 51 cases, this led to harmful outcomes. For example:
A patient attended with abdominal pain and was advised they had irritable bowel syndrome but
investigations recently have revealed late stage ovarian cancer with spread to the lymph nodes. If an
ultrasound scan had been done earlier this could have been detected sooner.
Reports also described situations in which, if clinicians had organised further investigations or put in place
a safety net for the patient to return, serious diagnoses could have been detected sooner. For example:
Patient presented with frank haematuria from which a renal carcinoma was identified. It was noted
that patient had presented last year with another incident of haematuria urinalysis * 2 positive for
blood microscopy negative not investigated further.
Delays in undertaking investigations, largely because of waiting lists, carry a risk of delayed treatment for
preventable illness and worsening of the condition. It was apparent, however, that if the patient did not
demand to be seen or undergo an investigation, then such delays would not be identified. For example:
2-week-rule referral made by GP for suspected pancreatic cancer due to jaundice and deranged
bloods. Seen in clinic and urgent scan was requested [by hospital team]. Patient re-attended surgery
several times and scan date was chased. GP chased scan report as now 5 weeks post referral and still
no [date]. Eventual diagnosis made of pancreatic cancer.
Practical and administrative barriers for labelling and transfer of specimens
Errors in administration (i.e. form filling, labelling, completing the form), although common (n = 796,
59%), largely resulted in low harms, such as the need for retesting. Transport errors were also reported;
the issue of ‘sample deterioration’ was highlighted and concern was raised about result accuracy and
impact on correct interpretation when needless delays in transfer had occurred.
Administrative failures leading to delays, incorrect results or failure to
receive results
Issues with the administrative (electronic and paper-based) processes enabling the timely receipt of test
results were described in 240 reports. These issues were varied and included not receiving the results,
delays in receiving the results and receiving inaccurate results. Communication issues between
professionals and inconsistent message-handling procedures within GP surgeries were also implicated.
Failures in practice processes to review results that did not occur on the same day as investigation, or those
being processed out of hours and noted as urgent, was a recurring issue. For example:
. . . lab phoned through a result early afternoon giving a high potassium level, they said it needed to
be reported to a GP asap but with no other indication of urgency GP on call was already out on visits
and could not be contacted by phone, there were no other GPs in the building. Unfortunately the
patient died whilst packing his bag to go to hospital.
Most test results are sent electronically to practices, with paper copies often sent afterwards as a safety
net. However, although the GP might read an electronic report, over-reliance on the software for planning
next steps for management in the clinical record system does highlight the need for parallel (possibly
manual) processes when the findings are potentially so serious. For example:
The patient presented with cough, bloody sputum . . . known smoker and heavy drinker. A chest X-ray
was ordered and patient given [a]moxil 500 mg × 21. [software] mailbox showed that the GP had read
the X-ray report but there was no direction shown, it was left unedited, no action taken, The X-ray
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was not ‘sent to anyone‘ it appears to have dropped from the active mailbox into a ‘bucket‘ awaiting
action. (WORSE [sic] than this the GP did not know about the ‘bucket‘.) . . . The chest X-ray showed an
early lung tumour which was not picked up until the patient presented 1 year later. His condition is
now advanced and probably terminal. The GP had 10 minutes training on [software] with 4 GPs
around one computer.
Misinformed clinical decision-making and incorrectly interpreted
investigation results
Errors in responding to test results in a timely manner were cited in 125 reports (10% of all investigative
process errors), of which 82 described harm outcomes. For example:
Elderly male patient . . . attended surgery with recent but not current chest pain. Given ECG
[electrocardiography], which was misread. Patient advised to return home but should have been sent
to hospital urgently. Patient died at home from heart attack within 24–48hrs . . . Evidence the machine
may have given GP undue confidence in his diagnosis, as it gave a reading of normal sinus rhythm.
Unreliable or non-existent processes underpinned failures to review patients’ notes before the end of the
general practice day or rerouting results to the wrong doctor for review.
Timely diagnosis and assessment
Overview
Seven hundred and twenty-eight reports (5% of total reports) described issues with diagnosis and
assessment of patients; three themes were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions of events
and contributory factors:
1. timely triage and assessment of patients
2. patient assessment for safe discharge
3. missed or wrong diagnosis.
The majority of reports described harm, and 3 in 5 of those incidents resulted in serious harm outcomes
(n= 366, 64%). Table 12 provides a summary of incident themes and subthemes.
Four in 10 reports had identifiable contributory factors (n = 292, 40%). Reports largely described four key
contributory issues: lack of continuity of care (n = 56, 19%); staff decision-making processes, mainly
related to a failure to follow protocols or insufficient knowledge (n = 52, 18%); patient characteristics such
as age, frailty or not having English as a first language (n = 51, 17%); and disease characteristics such as
rare conditions or a rare presentation of a condition (n = 48, 16%).
Further examination of diagnosis and assessment themes
Timely triage and assessment of patients
Timely triage and assessment issues were described in 242 reports; they included failures to recognise acutely
unwell patients (n= 32) and those at risk of deterioration (n = 29), patients who were vulnerable to abuse or
being abused (n= 19), and those at risk of harm from mental health problems (n = 30). For example:
Call received regarding a child who had died, the mother reported that she had sought assessment
and advice from NHS Direct. The call was prioritised as a P2 and placed in the First Advice Queue.
It was picked up by X 24 minutes later. The child was assessed using the ‘Breathing problems toddler
Age 1–4 years Algorithm’ and a disposition of self care was recorded. Boards have reviewed the call
and concerns raised regarding the quality of assessment and appropriateness of the disposition.
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Problems with triage processes were described in relation to HCPs in 13 reports and non-HCPs in eight reports.
In another example involving telephone triage, the severity of the patient’s condition was not ascertained:
Patient telephoned NHS Direct following aches in her shoulders and experiencing excess wind.
After clinical assessment they advised the patient she was probably suffering from trapped wind and
received information relating to indigestion. Following the call to NHS Direct the patient symptoms
worsened and her husband telephoned 999 for an ambulance. Whilst the patient husband was on the
telephone, the patient collapsed, lost consciousness and subsequently died. The post mortem report
stated that the cause of death was ischaemic heart disease and coronary artery atheroma.
A failure to recognise signs of abuse was preceded by poor information transfer from secondary to primary
care in 22 reports, and by a failure to refer for nursing care on discharge from hospital in nine reports.
Contributory factors included lack of continuity of care with out-of-hours services (n = 14), and 10 reports
queried whether or not the HCP cited in the report had sufficient professional knowledge. Serious harm
outcomes were described in 86 reports (61%).
Patient assessment for safe discharge
Issues with risk assessment for discharge were described in 141 reports. Analysis of linked incidents
showed that this resulted in multiple problems following discharge, including poor information transfer to
primary care (n = 51), failure to refer patients for emergency care when indicated (n = 9), failure to refer
patients for nursing care at home (n = 8), prescribing errors (n = 7) and problems with the provision of care
equipment (n = 28). Such issues described in reports are reflected in the following example:
Message received from GP [Date] – patient was discharged from . . . ward [day before] late pm – no
referral sent to child district nurse. Urinary catheter (long term) in situ. No advice given to family re
changing bags/care of catheter and no bags supplied on discharge. No information whether DN
[district nurse] can change catheter.
TABLE 12 Themes and subthemes of diagnosis- and assessment-related incidents
Theme Harm, n (%)
Total (%)Subtheme Yes No Serious Not specified
Missed or delayed diagnosis 297 (86) 8 (2) 217 (63) 40 (11) 345 (100)
Missed/delayed diagnosis 285 7 207 39 331
Wrong diagnosis 12 1 10 1 14
Timely triage and assessment of patients 189 (78) 12 (5) 118 (49) 41 (17) 242 (100)
Triage process 39 6 28 11 56
Identifying acute conditions 30 1 23 1 32
Identifying risk of deterioration 3 0 2 0 3
Delayed assessment for care 27 1 3 0 28
Identifying vulnerable patients 9 1 4 9 19
Refusal to do home visit 9 0 4 2 11
Examination of patient 7 1 4 2 10
History taking 0 1 0 3 4
Identifying mental health issues 29 0 29 1 30
Other 36 1 21 12 49
Discharge risk assessment 89 (63) 13 (9) 31 (22) 39 (28) 141 (100)
TOTAL 575 33 366 120 728
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The next example describes the discharge of twin babies with a complex in-hospital history:
The health visitor carried out a primary birth visit following the twins’ discharge from the SCBU (Special
Care Baby Unit). There was no discharge letter with information for the service or medications required.
No discharge plan. No resuscitation training given to the parent. The mother stated that she was told it
would be given prior to discharge, but that it was not received. Twins discharged on oxygen therapy.
No apnoea monitor. No risk assessment surrounding the twins’ care. No official referral to the paediatric
community nurse and no involvement pre-discharge. The paediatric community nurse was not informed
of the discharge. The twins had been cared for over the past seven weeks in the SCBU (Special Care
Baby Unit). No liaison had been made with the community staff.
Most (75%) patients affected were aged ≥ 66 years, possibly reflecting the complex needs of the elderly
on discharge. Not all reports highlighted so many opportunities to improve clinical care as the previous
example. Only 21% of reports (n = 30) documented a contributory factor, of which the majority (n = 17)
discussed the complexity of the patient in terms of comorbidities. This may be because the reports were
written in primary care and, therefore, the report writer was not involved in planning the discharge.
Missed or delayed diagnosis
Problems with diagnosis were identified in 345 reports, with 86% (n = 297) describing a harm outcome.
A total of 331 reports described a missed or delayed diagnosis. The conditions that were missed were
wide-ranging and included fractures, tuberculosis, diabetes mellitus, infection, pregnancy and myocardial
infarction. These cases illustrate the difficulty of clinical decision-making in complex patients with
undifferentiated presentations, for example, delineating between known side effects from a prescribed
drug and a possible red flag for a more serious diagnosis:
The patient was an 85-year-old man with dementia and Parkinson disease who had symptoms of
diarrhoea and was taking Aricept[®, Pfizer Inc., New York, NY, USA]. The diarrhoea was attributed to
being a side effect of his Aricept and the doctor failed to diagnose his progressed colon carcinoma.
A missed or delayed cancer diagnosis was described in 128 reports. Diagnostic problems were preceded by
insufficient assessment in seven reports, by insufficient examination in eight reports and by failure to
recognise acute conditions in seven reports, which suggests that missed or delayed diagnoses are
underpinned by lack of clinical skills. This is also suggested by the 16 reports in which the knowledge or
skill of the HCP was described as a contributory factor. For example, a lack of prior knowledge of the
patient’s history would make it more difficult to interpret test results and determine if they were normal,
as was evident in the following example:
Patient had undergone radical prostatectomy for cancer. Had follow up PSA [prostate-specific antigen]
levels – which should be undetectable. Any detectable PSA level, even in ‘normal’ range, is abnormal.
Previous detectable level passed as normal result. The patient noticed this.
In 31 cases, the rare presentation of a condition was a contributory factor, and in 18 reports, the
continuity of care between primary HCPs was discussed. The latter contributory factor was associated with
high rates of harmful outcomes, as 72% (n = 207) of cases led to serious harm.
Fewer reports (n = 14) described a wrong diagnosis. These reports related to wide variety of conditions,
some of which were more serious than others. Wrong diagnoses were largely, although not exclusively,
due to failures of professional competence, such as failing to examine a patient fully; however, some were
attributed to unusual clinical presentations (undifferentiating signs or symptoms) and these cases
accounted for a high proportion of serious harm incidents (n = 10, 71%).
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Treatment and care equipment
Overview
Incidents involving treatment and care equipment provided for community care were described in
754 reports (6% of total reports). Three themes were evident from synthesis of the reported descriptions
of events and contributory factors:
1. decisions about methods of administering treatments
2. complications of therapeutic procedures
3. functioning and availability of care equipment.
Table 13 provides an overview of themes and subthemes related to treatment and care equipment and
associated levels of harm.
Harm was identified in the majority of reports (n = 515, 68%). Serious harm was caused by 15% of these
incidents (n = 116). The unavailability of functioning care equipment (n = 338), such as beds to prevent
pressure sores or catheter replacements, was the most common incident, followed by problems carrying
out treatments in the community (n = 291).
A large proportion of reports (n = 55, 21%) were related to patient characteristics such as age, frailty or
pregnancy. Other contributory factors included patients not following advice or having sufficient knowledge
for safe self-care (n = 48, 18%), or making mistakes such as misreading information (n = 27, 10%).
TABLE 13 Themes and subthemes of treatment- and care equipment-related incidents
Theme Harm, n (%)
Total (%)Subtheme Yes No Serious
Not
specified
Decisions about methods of administering treatments 95 (76) 8 (6) 32 (26) 22 (18) 125 (100)
No treatment 14 1 3 4 19
Insufficient treatment 62 6 20 16 84
Incorrect treatment 17 1 7 2 20
Other 2 0 2 0 2
Complications of treatment procedures 230 (79) 21 (7) 57 (20) 40 (14) 291 (100)
Ordering treatment 1 0 0 0 1
Implementation 48 13 9 18 79
Complication 135 2 38 15 152
Timeliness 39 4 9 6 49
Choosing correct procedure 5 2 0 1 8
Wrong site/side 1 0 0 0 1
Other 1 0 1 0 1
Functioning and availability of care equipment 190 (56) 35 (10) 27 (8) 113 (33) 338 (100)
Lack of functioning therapeutic equipment 72 7 13 18 97
Insufficient supply of care adjunct 5 6 0 12 23
Failure of equipment 104 21 11 71 196
Stolen 0 0 2 5 5
Other 9 1 1 7 17
TOTAL 515 64 116 175 754
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Further examination of treatment and care equipment themes
Decisions about methods of administering treatments
An error in the clinical decision of what, if any, treatment to give a patient was identified in 125 reports,
with 95 (76%) describing a harm outcome. These decisions were subdivided into three subthemes.
1. No treatment was given (n = 19, 15%). Treatments not administered varied but included insulin,
dressings and emergency contraception. In 15 cases, another incident was involved, for example a
pregnant patient was not treated for herpes infection because her laboratory results were not acted on
and another patient’s pressure ulcer was not treated because the equipment that was ordered was not
in stock. Only three (16%) of these reports resulted in serious harm.
2. Insufficient treatment or monitoring was undertaken (n = 84, 68%). Pressure ulcers developed or
deteriorated in 33 reports, often because of the lack of equipment, patients choosing not to use
suggested treatment or poor care. Other reports described GPs calling an ambulance for sick patients,
but not monitoring them or starting basic treatment while waiting for the ambulance. Twenty incidents
in this category (24%) led to serious harm.
3. Incorrect treatment (n = 20, 16%) following clinical assessment. This was a diverse group, with reports
describing the wrong type of dressing used on leg ulcers, insertion of contraindicated intrauterine
contraceptive coils and cauterising a cancerous ‘wart’.
Complications of treatment procedures
Complications arising during procedures were described in 291 (39%) reports. Minor infections following
minor surgery and needle-stick injuries were described. More serious outcomes highlight the major risks
associated even with commonplace procedures performed in general practice, which included uterine
perforation following coil insertion, a fragment of a needle remaining in the shoulder joint after injection
and an abscess forming at an injection site. These incidents were generally considered a complication of a
procedure rather than being attributed to poor technique; thus, only 29 reports (10%) had an identifiable
contributory factor, of which 10 were related to the patient’s pathophysiology, and only three were
considered to be due to a HCP’s lack of skills.
Incidents in which a procedure was not carried out correctly, resulting in poor infection control,
needle-stick injuries, dressings adherent to wounds, new leg wounds from incorrect bandaging or urinary
retention, were described in 79 reports. Contributory factors included failure to follow protocol (n = 9),
inadequate skill set (n = 8) and staff mistakes (n = 8).
The other apparently important group was incidents related to timeliness of treatment (n = 49, 17%).
Many of these involved the care of catheters, but incidents related to the emergency care of patients and
wound care were also reported. For example:
Patient called *** as catheter had fallen out during the night. *** called district nurse and left a
message at 03:40 giving details of the problem and asking if they could attend in the morning to
re-catheterise. Patient was wearing a pad. It was a Sunday and worker alone got a message just after
08:00 and was unable to attend immediately.
In 40 of the 49 reports, the incident occurred because the district nurses did not receive a referral on
discharge. Of those, nine reports (18%) described serious harm outcomes.
Functioning and availability of care equipment
Errors around the provision and operation of equipment involved in patient care were described in 338
(45%) reports. Failure of equipment was common (n = 196, 58%), and the most frequently reported
types of incident involved malfunctioning of pressure-relieving equipment, fridges going above the
recommended temperature range and power cuts compromising IT systems’ functioning.
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Issues directly related to access to care equipment such as dressings, insulin needles or catheters were
identified in 97 reports. For example, some patients were sent home from hospital without the necessary
equipment and in other cases pharmacies incorrectly dispensed a short-term rather than a long-term
catheter. In 28 reports, poor discharge planning preceded problems with care equipment provision.
Insufficient supply of care equipment was reported 23 times, and was generally related to not having the
right equipment in the surgery or central stores. Items included electrocardiography paper, blood bottles,
dressing packs and continence pads.
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Chapter 7 Discussion of findings and
recommendations
Main findings
This is the largest analysis of general practice patient safety incident reports undertaken. We have
developed a method to derive learning from general practice patient safety incident reports to identify
priority issues to guide future improvement efforts.
We will first discuss our main findings in relation to the methods development needed to undertake this
study and observations about the completeness and accuracy of the incident reports reviewed. We will
then consider the implications of the recommendations for research and development identified within,
and between, the themes from each incident category.
Quality of National Reporting and Learning System reports
Development of a comprehensive classification system to characterise safety incident reports in general
practice has permitted the description of events leading up to patient safety incidents, their reported
contributory factors (human and system issues), and patient- and system-level outcomes. We propose that
four independent classes (a description of the incident, its contributory factors and the type and level of
harm) should provide sufficient minimal information for practising HCPs to identify learning for
improvements in future practice from the reports.
The manual coding of reports was a resource-intensive process in terms of the application of codes and
the development of the code book. Codes within each class were inductively added and amended
throughout the study, with fewer iterations needed towards the end of the study. We consider that the
regular team meetings we held to discuss such changes would need to be emulated by those responsible
for the analysis of incident reports within health-care organisations.
Our methods of analysis (EDA and thematic analysis) were designed to permit future adoption in
health-care organisations by HCPs with minimal training. Further work is now needed to develop and test
the content and delivery of such training. Outcomes from analysis (e.g. clustered bar charts) were also
chosen to provide a logical account of how priority issues for possible intervention were identified. In
addition, clinical expertise supported interpretation of context and identification of the implications of the
described safety incidents on patients and their families. Our findings are hypothesis generating, inductive
in nature and require testing and development by further research and clinical practice improvement.
At best, around one-third of reports contained descriptions of contributory factors. This represents a major
missed opportunity to learn from patient safety incidents. Descriptions of contributory factors, when
considered in relation to the type of incident and context, can provide a steer on potential causes of
patient safety incidents and inform the conceptual design of interventions to mitigate future harms. A total
of 462 discrete NHS organisations uploaded at least one incident report, although over half of the reports
originated from just 30 organisations (n = 7071, 51.6%). This implies that some organisations do not
report general practice safety incidents to the NRLS, or do not have mechanisms for receiving reports from
general practice in its organisation.
The number of reports excluded from the analysis suggests a misguided use of local reporting systems in
terms of knowledge and understanding of its purpose.
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Crosscutting issues for research and development
Our discussion of key findings from incident report analysis is focused on the themes informed by the
most frequent and most harmful reports. Identifiable contributory factors, interpreted in terms of the
incident type, the context in which they occurred and patient outcomes, support the basis of our
recommendations. Our recommendations are exclusively focused on systems improvement since there was
no apparent focus on human-specific recommendations from our analyses. When human error was
described as an implicated contributing factor to the developing incident, the professional involved was
usually working within a complex system with less than optimal work processes. However, we stress that
the focus on systems does not negate the HCP’s duty to report a safety incident. We also recognise the
need to enable practitioners to be provided with regular updates of learning from safety incidents that
examine human factors.
We will focus our recommendations for research and development on four broad areas:
1. maximising opportunities to learn from patient safety incidents via mandatory data capture and a
national, co-ordinated effort to support organisations to build the capacity and capability of their
workforces to report data for learning
2. testing methods to identify and manage vulnerable patients at risk of deterioration, unscheduled
hospital admission or readmission following discharge from hospital
3. building IT infrastructure to enable details of all health-care encounters to be recorded in one system,
aid communication between professionals and services and support safer administrative practices
(e.g. prescribing, referral and discharge communication)
4. activating the patient, parent and carer role in preventing patient safety incidents.
Improvement efforts to develop, test and implement solutions across these four broad areas of
recommendation will address the prevention of the vast majority of safety incidents analysed within this study.
Maximise opportunities to learn from patient safety incidents
Confront the blame culture
A culture of blame within NHS organisations is often described when a patient safety incident occurs.81–84
For over a decade, seminal patient safety policy documents and initiatives have highlighted that patient
safety incidents are largely the result of poorly designed systems.85 Several public inquiries have highlighted
the detrimental consequences of a workforce that practises in fear of reprimand and punitive action
following a medical error.10,81,84,86
The UK policy document An Organisation with a Memory signalled the need to learn lessons from medical
errors in order to prevent future, similar events.87 Patient safety incident reporting was heralded as an
important mechanism to create learning, as part of an ongoing commitment to support a safe culture with
a learning ethos, in which individuals acknowledge and learn from patient safety incidents.88,89 Reporting
and learning systems rely on HCPs to report, and be open about, patient safety incidents that they witness
or are involved in.90 Fear of blame, however, poses a significant barrier to staff fulfilling this duty and
creates missed opportunities for system learning and improvement, often at a huge cost to the individual
staff members.86,88,91–94
Previous studies have demonstrated that when HCPs report incidents, the narrative often reflects the fact
that responsibility for the incident is placed on an individual through ‘person-blaming,’ rather than blaming
the organisation or failings in the system.95 This is, however, contrary to the mantra encouraged by patient
safety initiatives worldwide. It is well acknowledged that uncertainty about the implications of reporting,
not least the personal shame about involvement in a medical error, fuels barriers to incident reporting.92,96
The ‘second victim’ concept describes the experience of HCPs who are involved in safety incidents and
suffer psychological distress in the aftermath of a medical error. Loss of confidence, low self-esteem
and self-doubt are well-documented issues.86
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The term ‘whistleblowing’ has traditionally been coined to describe situations in which HCPs speak up
about major system failures, malpractice, wrongdoing or fraud.8 The term often conjures negative
professional connotations as a result of high-profile cases within medicine of clinicians who have been
disgraced as a result of speaking up in the interests of patient safety.97,98 This has become evident in
organisations where undue emphasis has been placed on the ‘active failure’ aspect of the incident
in which an acute error has played a role in the event evolution, whereas the ‘latent system conditions,’ in
which poor system defences act as predisposing weaknesses, receive less consideration. Although both
of these components are important and frequently occur in combination, active errors are unduly
emphasised, with blame, in the majority of cases, falling on individuals and teams.99 This is often apparent
in media coverage of patient safety incidents.
Li et al.100 examined 64 news articles about medical errors printed in newspapers from six countries and
concluded that the articles rarely accounted for system failures or approached the error without bias. Of
the studied articles, 60% were reported from the viewpoint of a legal expert or patient with investment in
the error, and often demonstrated a ‘person approach’ by blaming individuals, which was the case in 41%
of the articles. The study also highlighted that 40% of news reports failed to signpost the importance of
system failures in the evolution of the error.100 In the UK, 53% of articles discussed errors negatively,
compared with 14% in the USA.101,102 These draw public attention to human failures and place blame on
individual HCPs. These may all be well-intentioned attempts by health-care organisations to be seen to be
acting on concerns raised by patients; however, this blame culture has the effect of reducing clinicians’
motivation to report patient safety incidents and preventing learning from incidents that may help to
prevent future health care-related harm to patients.100
Shift focus from human to system failures
Diagnostic errors, for example, can be described as cognitive, system or ‘no-fault’ errors, and may be
errors of commission or omission. Croskerry et al.103 describe a number of initiatives for mitigating specific
cognitive errors in practice,104 in keeping with current literature around improving diagnosis and
assessment by reducing dependence on flawless cognitive performance. Schiff et al.105 described the
importance of adopting better multidisciplinary approaches, reducing pressure on clinicians to rely solely on
their memory and clinical experience when making diagnoses, and instead supporting them by means of
computerised and non-technological aids.106 This supports our findings, which demonstrate that lack of
knowledge, oversights and mistakes were frequently described staff factors contributing to patient safety
incidents. Cognitive errors, which are often unexpected active errors of commission, complicate the
process of improving patient safety; however, focus on providing safe systems and safety-netting may help
minimise patient harm when errors occur.106
Previous studies have highlighted the importance of streamlining systems for referral and discharge or
follow-up, using electronic systems to unify patient records.107 Electronic systems are being developed to
support a number of aspects of the diagnosis and assessment process. There is increasing support for the
use of clinician decision support systems, to assist in managing consultations.108,109 For example, a system
proposed by de Wit et al.110 supports the management of polypharmacy in the elderly patient population.
Vulnerable patients were described within the reports analysed. Elderly patients, patients with acute illness or
disability have been associated with an increased risk of patient safety incidents.111 Such patients often
experience multiple comorbidities and run the risk that new pathologies will be overlooked as clinicians focus
on existing diagnoses which can undermine the presentation of new pathology.112–114 In addition, they may
be incapable of raising concerns about their care or lack agency in decision-making. Guthrie et al.112
described polypharmacy and choice of acceptable care strategies as specific issues for patients with
comorbidities yet to be addressed in policy. Limited resources exist to guide practitioners in managing this
demographic. Involvement of patients in training HCPs, to improve management of the vulnerable, has been
associated with improvements in patient satisfaction, with no clear detrimental effects.115,116 Cross-linking
electronic guidelines for the management of related disorders, and to aid recognition of red flags to minimise
diagnostic overshadowing, is a further proposal for practice-level improvement to mitigate human error.112
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04270 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 27
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Carson-Stevens et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State
for Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
47
Build capacity and capability of information technology infrastructure
Building IT infrastructure and functionality capable of sharing data between health- and social-care
providers could support identification of predictors of risk and inform interventions to prevent future
incidents.117 In addition, efforts to transition existing written processes, and alignment of existing electronic
processes, could support HCPs to have timely and reliable access to health-care data needed for safer
consultations and permit continuity of care across different health- and social-care sectors.
Based on our findings, referral and discharge processes require attention. The receipt of poor-quality,
and sometimes inappropriate, referrals received by district nursing teams is well described,118–122 and each
unclear referral has been estimated to cause 5 hours of extra work for district nurse teams.123 To overcome
variability in referral processes, the development and testing of a single, unified electronic referral process
with an agreed baseline of minimal information should be agreed between professionals in primary and
secondary care settings.
NHS England and other organisations have previously reported that failures in communication processes
can account for up to 33% of discharge-related safety incidents.124,125 Electronic discharge documentation
could prevent most paper-based administration failures,126–128 and, across the UK, a process is under way to
support 24-hour electronic discharge.129–131 However, we believe that electronic discharge summaries
should be based on accepted best practices, such as those developed by the Scottish Intercollegiate
Guidelines Network,132 as well as consensus agreement by primary and secondary care professionals about
the minimal essential information that should be included. In parallel, patient-held records could aid
understanding about a recent hospital stay and follow-up plans.133–135
Identify patients at high risk of harm in the community
Reports describing failures of timely diagnosis and assessment, the availability of treatments and care
equipment, and lack of continuity of care following discharge often involved patients with social or
medical issues that compromised their ability to access GP services.
Exploring the accessibility of clinical services must be a priority for all health-care organisations, and
general practices should determine whether or not their existing telephone call-handling processes meet
the needs and expectations of their patient population. In 2015, a randomised controlled trial by
Campbell et al.136 was not sufficiently powered to detect differences in safety outcomes (in terms of
patient mortality, emergency hospital admissions, and accident and emergency attendance rates)
between same-day consultations with GPs/telephone calls, nurse-led computer-supported services and
usual care. However, the accompanying process evaluation recognised the importance of culture, capacity
and involvement of all practice staff when introducing such major changes to access. The authors
recommended examination of significant event audits to explore safety outcomes.137 We support this
recommendation given the diversity of issues patients face while accessing clinical services, in particular the
need to focus future improvement efforts on vulnerable patient populations.
In 2015, Warren et al.138 highlighted the need to explore the drivers of satisfaction among patients
from ethnic minority groups. Our findings support this, and determining what constitutes patient
satisfaction, particularly among those seeking urgent medical attention, will be an important informant of
the design of future improvement projects that seek to develop an accessible system.139 How best to
determine those estimates of patient satisfaction within general practice should be explored with priority
patient groups (e.g. the socially deprived, the elderly or homeless people). Issues identified within incident
reports could empirically inform those inquiries.
Patients recently discharged from hospital and those receiving end-of-life care in the community or requiring
regular district nursing involvement frequently did not receive timely follow-up by community HCPs. Exploring
options to intervene early, to manage patients at home and to mitigate avoidable deterioration through
proactive intervention is needed. Different options that could achieve this are described in NHS England’s
General Medical Services ‘enhanced service’ for vulnerable groups,140 which describes a complex intervention
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that includes same-day telephone consultations for patients at risk of unplanned hospital admission and
timely follow-up by a HCP in the practice on discharge from hospital. Although we acknowledge the unclear
benefits of standalone system changes such as telephone triage,136,137 a synergy might be evident from new
models that combine same-day telephone triage and risk stratification (or other options).
Given the failures in care that we have identified, we agree with NHS England that new services are
needed to support GPs to develop and test new models of care delivery for the ‘enhanced service’:
(1) rapid response community nursing; (2) support from mental health service providers; (3) designated
district nursing; (4) additional discharge co-ordinator services; (5) additional support for carers; and
(6) targeted social-care services.136 Given the largely social nature of such interventions and the risk of
outcome-based evaluation determining the net effect to be minimal, formative theory-driven evaluation
options should be considered.141,142
Activate the patient role in safety
Cultivating conditions in which patients, parents and carers feel comfortable challenging HCPs is needed
and could prevent safety incidents.143 Encouraging patients and HCPs to co-design new models of care
delivery that inform local improvement initiatives should be encouraged; for example, improvement in the
parent–provider relationship could increase child safety.144–146 Public health organisations and researchers
must seek to establish what methods of communication work best for different patient and parent groups,
and embrace the challenge of undertaking research with and for vulnerable patient populations.
Providing patients with access to their medical records could reduce documentation discrepancies and
appointment-related incidents, as well as provide HCPs with a safety net.143 Such incidents could also be
prevented by providing staff with better accessibility to unified records.147
As care models for different patient groups change, investment is required to maximise patient understanding
and empowerment to use those services. There is also a broader need to continue efforts to educate the
public on the role of each health-care provider (e.g. general practice, pharmacy, optician, clinical injuries unit),
and what the expectations of those services can be, including when and how to access each service.
Implications for future practice and research
Our ‘actionable findings’ provide the basis for improvements and interventions, and should be evaluated
in practice as to if, and how, they can best achieve the desired benefits for patient safety. They will be
considered under groups of recommendations that apply to general practices and health-care organisations,
and for the wider health-care system.
What can general practices do?
Identify at-risk patients
Practices can immediately explore their current processes for identifying patients who could be stratified to
be at high risk of deterioration, unplanned admission or readmission following discharge from hospital.
This should include multidisciplinary team involvement for undertaking the assessment of these patients to
achieve integrated care.
Examine patient satisfaction in relation to perceived accessibility
Perceptions of barriers to clinical services must be explored with patients. First steps could include
determining whether or not patients find existing telephone and call-handling processes meet their needs
and expectations.
All GP surgeries can immediately seek to appoint a patient representative(s) to attend meetings to discuss
process changes that will affect how patients receive and interact with services.
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What can health-care organisations do?
Report-assisted improvement
Practices must be supported to develop a learning culture by being encouraged to use their own data
(e.g. significant event audits and GP-related patient safety incident reports) to identify potential candidate
areas for small, local improvement efforts.
At an organisational level, those responsible for governance could support the identification of similar
incident reports between practices in order to identify sources of error and use those ideas to inform
system redesign efforts to minimise future risk to patients. For example, if there is a sufficient volume of
incident reports around a specific theme, such as vaccination error, Pareto charts can be generated to
prioritise immediate next steps for improvement projects.22
Organisations might also seek to identify the ‘beacons’ for others to aspire to. For example, general
practices that have high patient satisfaction scores for different patient groups, including socially and
medically vulnerable patients, could be identified and their models of delivery observed to determine
whether or not there are best practices that can be shared widely for quality improvement.
Prepare the workforce to report
There is a need to develop a culture of open reporting among HCPs and staff in general practice.
This must also extend to patients and carers, and mechanisms for escalating concerns and reporting
patient safety incidents must be made clear.
To ensure that future incident reports can inform future improvement efforts, the workforce must be
provided with patient safety training that increases understanding about the rationale for reporting and
prepares them to identify human factors. This could yield more informative narratives for informing
systems improvement.
Education providers such as the Institute for Healthcare Improvement provide free access for student HCPs
to undertake courses on patient safety, including human factors and root cause analysis. National efforts
include the ‘Improving Quality Together’ programme, which is the national quality improvement learning
programme for all NHS Wales staff to develop the skills and gain accreditation in quality improvement
methodology. It is anticipated that this will enable a consistent approach to improving the quality of
services that will help improvements take place much more quickly and spread effectively throughout the
country. Organisations should examine its existing infrastructure for receiving reports and disseminating
learning back to practice, and monitoring the success of those mechanisms. Competencies around incident
reporting may be best demonstrated via appraisal or revalidation processes, or linked to the Quality and
Outcomes Framework requirements.
What can national bodies interested in patient safety do?
Support general practices to contribute to the National Reporting and
Learning System
At present, there are numerous channels to report patient safety incidents. These include the NRLS, the
National Clinical Assessment Service, the General Medical Council and locally at practice level through
significant event analyses. The Care Quality Commission also conducts routine inspections of general
practices. These systems do not communicate with each other, resulting in an incomplete national picture
on patient safety in primary care. There is a need to create a single mechanism of data capture.
Currently, in terms of mandatory data capture, the only incidents that must be reported are never events.
A set of such events relevant to primary care, such as those developed by de Wet et al.,148 should
be implemented.
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An opportunity exists to better use the analysis of routinely available health-care data, such as patient safety
incident report data, to inform the designs of improvement projects. Incident reports are essentially a
collection of change ideas to inform the identification of priority areas for quality improvement in practice.
The Five Year Forward View presents an opportunity to deliver the necessary system changes to bring
patient safety in primary care to the fore.149
Co-ordinated expert analysis at a national level
In order to generate recommendations for practice from patient safety incident reports from primary care
in England and Wales, we developed a mixed-methods approach that combined the aforementioned
detailed data coding process, descriptive statistical analysis, and a thematic analysis of reports. New ideas
and hypotheses emerged throughout each step of analysis. Subject matter experts discussed findings and
identified key areas for improvement.
Analysis of incident reports at a national level needs a combined enterprise between clinical, research and
patient safety experts to regularly review the output of analyses, to corroborate with existing insights from
research studies and improvement initiatives, and to develop potential action-orientated solutions with
strong face validity among the profession. Involvement of the Royal Colleges in dissemination of learning
will continue to be critical, particularly in terms of advocating the uptake of solutions by members and
recognising NRLS contributions for appraisal purposes. However, the future of the England and Wales
NRLS must be secured, in terms of providing both a means for national learning and the expertise and
resources needed to undertake regular systematic inquiries of these data.
Support the development of global learning registries
To advance and accelerate the primary care quality improvement agenda internationally, a global registry
for incident reporting could support the ability to generate action-orientated outputs with strong face
validity in the health-care profession.
The WHO has proposed a minimal information model to provide a data set in all countries for sharing patient
safety incident reports.150 Efforts will then need to be made to ensure that incident reports from each country
meet an acceptable standard to enable learning.
National (and the proposed international) patient safety incident report systems should be designed to
describe care failures and safety incidents, and also be utilised to shape priorities for improvement,
corroborate insights from research studies, develop potential solutions for application in practice, and share
learning of the context-specific approaches of application of solutions.
Data linkages within and between health- and social-care services
The potential value of data linkage to evaluate the impact of patient characteristics on health-care
outcomes was demonstrated in a recent UK-wide enquiry into child mortality.151 From our characterisation
of reports involving children, insights for prioritising and designing future safety interventions could be
gained by linking incident-reporting systems with electronic medical records and other public or social-care
registries. This would enable the identification of incident reports relevant to specific groups. Sheikh
et al.152 have outlined a strategy for health-care IT in the NHS which has four key components: (1) devolve
the decision-making processes about systems procurement to practising professionals; (2) consider offering
modest financial incentives and highlight the penalties for non-adopters of such systems in the future;
(3) governance to ensure safe sharing of data between providers; and (4) oversight from a national body
to co-ordinate national efforts to implement advanced health-care IT systems. Lessons from England’s
National Programme for Information Technology suggest that rigorous, independent evaluations of
implementation efforts are needed.153
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Further research
Analysis of reports from all primary care disciplines
Our potentially generalisable method for interrogating and identifying learning from incident reports
should now be applied to other primary care disciplines. In addition to general practice, there are several
other ‘point-of-first-access’ disciplines from primary care that have reported > 200,000 reports, which
includes dentistry, pharmacy, health visiting, nursing and midwifery. In the same way that general practice
reports were overlooked prior to this study, with the exception of medication- and pharmacy-related
reports, these reports have also never been systematically characterised to generate learning for primary
care patient safety.
In expectation of the need for this follow-on work, we have established the relevant academic, clinical and
policy links in each discipline in order to achieve this. Extending this work beyond the confines of general
practice is an important next step to advance the field of primary care patient safety, and there is an
obvious opportunity to obtain a more representative view of issues by analysing reports from other
disciplines. Each discipline is interested in the discipline-specific outputs from our study; thus, we would
propose that a sufficiently large sample be drawn from each discipline and that analysis is led by clinical
academics from each discipline.
Scoping reviews to identify potential interventions
To realise the full potential of incident reporting for informing the design of new care models, work must
now include scoping reviews to identify interventions and improvement initiatives that address the
priority recommendations that we recognise are broad in nature and highlight major cultural challenges
that need addressing. Similarly, we must identify solutions to prevent the most harmful and most frequent
safety incident types where possible. Determining the acceptability and feasibility of interventions with
HCPs in general practice (and wider) is needed with a view to evaluating their effectiveness when
implemented. We propose scoping reviews for the most frequent and more harmful incident types. This
method would enable us to search and synthesise both the published and grey literature, and utilise our
links with world-leading improvement organisations and field experts to identify and study initiatives that
are not likely to be described by publication.
Broader characterisation of priority areas in general practice
Our study has provided guidance on the nature and range of safety incident reports from general
practice. More focused coding and analysis of general practice reports is now needed. During our
preparatory work, we analysed all incident reports on children in general practice, all reports involving an
immunisation-related error in children and all discharge-related incidents in general practice. These
provided a greater volume of similar reports to generate hypotheses from. These more focused analyses
enabled more in-depth insights into the potential contributory issues, and the likely changes (both
concepts and ideas) that would be needed to enhance patient safety which in turn gave us a stronger
handle on the kinds of interventions needed.
We advocate that representative samples of reports be drawn from all primary care disciplines to
undertake characterisation of safety incidents in the following content areas:
l primary care mental health
l diagnosis and assessment
l care of the elderly
l out-of-hours care
l unwell children
l vulnerable patient groups.
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Natural language processing
Given that at least 13,699 reports have been manually coded by trained clinicians, the data set now
provides an opportunity to develop the technology capable of automating the analysis of incident reports
using natural language processing (NLP) methods, taking into consideration that free-text information from
incident reports is complex to code. NLP offers a set of informatics tools capable of transforming text into a
structured format that can be used for research and improvement. Extraction systems based on NLP have
been developed in the medical domain. These are yet to be explored for patient safety incident
report purposes.
Develop and test empirically informed care models
We have previously discussed how the outcomes from analysis of incident reports should empirically
inform the design of improvement initiatives.23 The value of incident-reporting systems will be realised by
HCPs only when their contributions are acknowledged and acted on. Creating an open culture of incident
reporting is needed in all care settings, and we recognise that this is an ongoing challenge in hospital
settings too. We believe that primary care can accelerate the pace of its quality improvement agenda by
using routine data sources like incident reports to identify local and national-level priorities based on the
insights of its HCPs and staff.
Strengths and limitations
This is the first mixed-methods analysis of safety incident reports from general practice in England and Wales.
Role of professionals in reporting incidents
Reporting systems rely on data input (reporting) to generate learning. Safety incident-reporting systems rely
on staff to write descriptions of incidents, including what happened and perceived reasons for why an
incident occurred.76 At a local level, these reports can inform the basis of recommendations to mitigate
harm in practice, and at a national level these reports may be used to identify issues that would otherwise
be overlooked. The information described on these forms can be understood as a form of ‘storytelling’
that represents the reporter’s position, perspective and experience, regardless of whether or not the
reporter witnessed the incident first hand.154–156
Only one-third of reports included in this analysis described potential contributory factors and reporters do
not routinely describe the organisational-level factors contributing to incidents. Furthermore, it is
recognised that incidents are under-reported, can represent only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ and can be limited
in narrative content.19 Although the NRLS accepts reports from patients and parents, few such reports
were apparent in our data set. Furthermore, there was likely to be differential reporting between
organisations (i.e. those with good reporting cultures are likely to contribute more than those without
such cultures).26,157
Both the coding process and thematic analysis are open to personal interpretation of the data, and may be
subject to confirmation bias. We sought to minimise personal interpretation of the data in stage 1 by
adhering to the nine rules of recursive incident analysis and designating codes that represent what was
explicitly stated in reports. In addition, methodological rigour was ensured by keeping an audit trail of all
coding-related decisions, holding weekly meetings to discuss analysis, and independent double-coding of
20% of reports, indicating a high degree of concordance.158 The reliability of Cohen’s kappa indicated that
researchers were applying the coding frameworks consistently. In stage 3 of the analysis, clinicians were
encouraged to use their clinical expertise and judgement for the interpretation of reports aligned with
priority issues identified by EDA.
Our analytical process required the rigour of an objective and structured coding process in stage 1 to
ensure confidence in the identification of priority issues in stage 2. To augment pragmatic, clinically
meaningful learning for improvement, a thematic analysis was undertaken in stage 3 that drew on the
clinical expertise of reviewers.
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Nature of findings
Our findings are hypothesis-generating, inductive in nature, and require testing and development in
further research.
Reporting to the NRLS has increased in the last decade, providing large numbers of data from which to
generate learning.159,160 There may be other harmful incident types occurring in primary care that are
under-reported because of a fear of being reprimanded.157 However, despite limitations from under-reporting
and reporting biases, analyses of NRLS data have played an important role in generating lessons to mitigate
harmful incidents in other areas of clinical practice.32,161
Incident-reporting culture
Incident reporting is widely understood to be imperative for generating system learning that improves
patient safety,10,89,162 yet the literature demonstrates that patient safety incidents are under-reported.19,81,104
As a result, there has been a great deal of interest in investigating barriers to medical incident
reporting.81,157,163,164 Fear of blame has been cited as a primary factor in the unwillingness of individual
doctors to report incidents.82,165 Waring93 notes that some doctors ‘referred to the excessive time required
for form filling that could be better spent with patients or the menial nature of paperwork that was
somehow beneath medical expertise’. Meanwhile, the literature also reports that some staff fail to
recognise how completing incident forms will impact on practice- or organisation-level change.93,166
These sociocultural determinants are broad, and the influence of each will vary between individuals and
institutions. However, they illustrate that even when there are procedures in place to encourage incident
reporting, and even when those policies clearly define which incidents need to be reported, there may be
mitigating factors. These environmental and personal issues may affect whether or not an incident is
reported, when an incident is reported and how it is reported. It is evident that there are significant
cultural and social factors that affect the processes of incident reporting in health-care settings. Despite
these limitations, the study findings highlight important challenges faced by patients and primary care
professionals in England and Wales.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions
Despite over a decade of patient safety research in the hospital setting, incident-reporting systems havestruggled to gain traction with the clinical community. Therefore, if HCPs in general practices are to
invest time and effort in reporting patient safety incidents, a robust method to learn about risk and to
generate strategies to minimise future patient risk is needed. Those professionals will want to see results.
An opportunity exists to support health-care organisations to exploit its local data to generate learning
from incident reports and inform its quality improvement agenda. This would enable each organisation to
undertake its own diagnostics for improvement and prioritise the issues that matter most to its workforce.
Our study is the first systematic analysis of safety incident reports from general practice in the NRLS.
Using mixed methods, we have empirically developed a classification to enable coding of patient safety
incident reports for the identification of the most common and frequent safety issues, as well as to
understand the underlying clinical context reported by HCPs. Opportunities to prevent the issues
underpinning the most commonly reported incidents, as well as those described as resulting in severe
harm or death, were identified. Recommendations have been made from this analysis by a multidisciplinary
team of clinicians, researchers and patient safety experts.
In order to advance the field of patient safety in primary care, regular interrogation of routine data, such as
incident reports, will be needed to inform the development of a national quality improvement agenda.
Although there are recognised limitations of safety-reporting system data, this study has generated
hypotheses through an inductive process that now requires development and testing through future
research and improvement efforts in clinical practice. Using the issues that matter most to professionals to
gain traction for buy-in could help to accelerate a culture of quality improvement in primary care.
The four classes of data (incident type, contributory factors, level of harm and outcomes) represent the
minimum data needed to identify learning to inform future practice improvement. However, major
variation currently exists in terms of report content and its ability to inform. Maximising opportunities to
learn from patient safety incidents via mandatory data capture and a national, co-ordinated effort to
support organisations to build the capacity and capability of their workforce to report data for learning
is needed.
Further work must now build on both deepening and broadening understanding of our study findings
through further characterisation of safety incident reports from the wider pool of all 270,000+ primary
care reports available. In parallel, scoping reviews must be undertaken to identify interventions for
incorporation into new models of care delivery for primary care. Evaluation of their effects on patient
safety and experience will be needed.
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Appendix 2 Rules of recursive model of
incident analysis
Rule Example
1. An incident has a set of contributing factors The wrong vaccine was administered (incident) because the
child’s ‘Red Book’ was not available (CF) and the computer
records were not up to date (CF)
2. An incident can be a contributing factor to another
incident
Records not up to date (incident and CF), the wrong vaccine
was administered (incident)
3. Some contributing factors cannot be incidents in their
own right
A mistake (CF, not an incident) led to the wrong prescribed
medication dose (incident)
4. An incident has a set of outcomes Wrong vaccine administered (incident) requiring the correct
vaccine to be administered (outcome)
5. An incident can be an outcome of another incident Records not up to date (incident) leading to the wrong number
of vaccine doses (incident and outcome)
6. Some outcomes cannot be incidents in their own
right
Admission to hospital (outcome) after wrong prescribed
medication (incident)
7. An outcome of an incident could be a contributing
factor to another incident
Communication error between HCPs (incident) led to records
not being up to date (incident and outcome) which led to a
vaccine-related error (incident)
8. An incident type can be designated the ‘principal
incident type’ (i.e. the incident proximal to the
descriptive patient outcome)
Communication error (incident) led to inaccurate records
(incident) and results in the incorrect vaccine administration
(principal incident type)
9. The outcome of a principal incident type cannot be
an incident
Admission to hospital (outcome) after failure to access relevant
HCP (principal incident type)
CF, contributory factor.
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Appendix 3 Primary care patient safety
classification (PISA) system
Example of incident descriptor framework
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Example of contributory factors framework
Example of outcomes framework
For a full copy of the PISA classification system please contact the corresponding author.
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